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I. INTRODUCTION
The debate over how Americans should select state and local
judges has reached the point of personal philosophy. There is little
that can be added to the intellectual discussion considering the
enormous amount of legal scholarship and writing that has been
committed to the subject.' The American Judicature Society has
spent over fifty years analyzing, evaluating, and espousing judicial
selection reform. 2 Its publication Judicature has been full of articles
discussing the top, the bottom, and every edge of the judicial selection
issue. The legal literature in other law reviews is equally rich and
varied. All aspects of the matter have been discussed from the
standpoint of theory, opinion, history, sociology, and empirical study.
This article will make no attempt to review, compare, or analyze
this library of information. My purposes are more refined and
personal.
My credentials and motivation for commenting on judicial se-
lection and expressing my thoughts on the matter derive from the
observations concerning the judicial selection processes I made during
my seventeen years as a professor at the University of Wyoming
College of Law and my involvement in Wyoming State Bar activities.
During these years the State of Wyoming had the wisdom to rewrite
the judicial article in its constitution and to include a change from
a nonpartisan election system to a merit selection plan.'
1. One frequent commentator on the subject suggests that judicial selection is
the most written about subject in legal publications. Philip L. DuBois, Account-
ability, Independence, and the Selection of State Judges: The Role of Popular
Judicial Elections, 40 Sw. L.J. 31, 31 (Special Issue, May 1986) ("Although surely
no one has made a formal count, it is fairly certain that no single subject has
consumed as many pages in law reviews and law-related publications over the past
fifty years as the subject of judicial selection.")
2. See Norman Krivosha, In Celebration of the 50th Anniversary of Merit
Selection, 74 JUDICATURE 128 (1990); Glenn R. Winters, A Half Century in Ret-
rospect, 72 JUDICATURE 92 (1988).
3. Merit selection, generally, refers to "[a] permanent nonpartisan commission
of lawyers and nonlawyers that initially and independently generates, screens and
submits a list of judicial nominees to an official who is legally or voluntarily bound
to make a final selection from the list." ALLAN ASHMAN & JAMES J. ALFINI, THE
KEY TO JUDICIAL MERIT SELECTION: THE NOMINATING PROCESS 12 (1974). Excluded
from this definition are systems that use a strict appointment or popular contested
elections as the selection system. Id. The "merit" part of the name refers to the
supposition that the commission will select its nominees on the basis of the members'
perceptions of good qualities for judges including aspects of character, experience,
and ability. See infra note 120 and accompanying text.
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It goes without saying that no system is perfect. Each system
has its selection disadvantages and problems.4 The absolute best
4. The issue of judicial selection has attracted a significant number of com-
mentators. The following materials contain a sampling of the literature during the
last 10 years. Lawrence R. Yetka & Christopher H. Yetka, The Selection and
Retention of Judges in Minnesota, 15 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 169 (1994);
Maura S. Schoshinski, Note, Towards an Independent, Fair, and Competent Ju-
diciary: An Argument for Improving Judicial Elections, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
839 (1994); Lawrence Schlam, State Constitutional Amending, Independent Inter-
pretation, and Political Culture: A Case Study In Constitutional Stagnation, 43
DEPAUL L. REV. 269 (1994); William J. Harbison, Passive Or Active?, 24 MEM.
ST. U. L. REV. 183 (1994); Bridget E. Montgomery & Christopher C. Conner,
Partisan Elections: The Albatross of Pennsylvania's Appellate Judiciary, 98 DICK.
L. REV. 1 (1993); Missouri Task Force on Gender and Justice, Report of the
Missouri Task Force on Gender and Justice, 58 Mo. L. REv. 485 (1993); Kurt E.
Scheuerman, Comment, Rethinking Judicial Elections, 72 OR. L. REV. 459 (1993);
W.J. Michael Cody, Special Ethical Duties for Attorneys Who Hold Public Positions,
23 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 453 (1993); Frank Upham, The Role of Lawyers in Social
Change: United States, 25 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 147 (1993); David W. Case,
In Search of an Independent Judiciary: Alternatives to Judicial Elections in Mis-
sissippi, 13 Miss. C. L. REV. 1 (1992); Orrin W. Johnson & Laura J. Urbis,
Judicial Selection in Texas: A Gathering Storm?, 23 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 525
(1992); Thomas P. Prehoditch, The Voting Rights Act and Judicial Selection
Litigation: An Evaluation of Remedial Options, 11 REV. LITIG. 523 (1992); John
D. Felice & John C. Kilwein, Strike One, Strike Two ... : The History of and
Prospect for Judicial Reform in Ohio, 75 JUDICATURE 193 (1992); Shawn Fremstad,
Note, State Judicial Elections and the Voting Rights Act: Defining The Proper
Remedial Scheme, 76 Mn4N. L. REV. 101 (1991); Madison B. McClellan, Note,
Merit Appointment Versus Popular Election: A Reformer's Guide to Judicial Se-
lection Methods in Florida, 43 FLA. L. REV. 529 (1991); April D. Dulaney, Comment,
A Judicial Exception for Judicial Elections: "A Burning Scar on the Flesh of the
Voting Rights Act", 65 TUL. L. REV. 1223 (1991); Donald W. Jackson.& James
W. Riddlesperger, Jr., Money and Politics in Judicial Elections: The 1988 Election
of the Chief Justice of the Texas Supreme Court, 74 JUDICATURE 184 (1990); John
M. Roll, Merit Selection: The Arizona Experience, 22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 837 (1990);
Norman Krivosha, In Celebration of the 50th Anniversary of Merit Selection, 74
JUDICATURE 128 (1990); Barbara L. Graham, Judicial Recruitment and Racial
Diversity On State Courts: An Overview, 74 JUDICATURE 28 (1990); Beth M.
Henschen et al., Judicial Nominating Commissioners: A National Profile, 73 JU-
DICATURE 328 (1990); Philip L. Dubois, Voter Responses to Court Reform: Merit
Judicial Selection on the Ballot, 73 JUDICATURE 238 (1990); Bernard Hirschhorn,
Richard Spencer Childs: The Political Reformer and His Influence on the Work
of the American Judicature Society, 73 JUDICATURE 184 (1990); William M. Pearson
& David S. Castle, Alternative Judicial Selection Devices: An Analysis of Texas
Judges' Attitudes, 73 JUDICATURE 34 (1989); Anthony Champagne, Judicial Reform
in Texas, 72 JUDICATURE 146 (1988); John M. Scheb, II, State Appellate Judges'
Attitudes Toward Judicial Merit Selection and Retention: Results of a National
Survey, 72 JUDICATURE 170 (1988); Franklin S. Spears, Selection of Appellate
Judges, 40 BAYLOR L. REV. 501 (1988); Robert S. Thompson, Judicial Retention
Elections and Judicial Method: A Retrospertive on the California Retention Election
of 1986, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 2007 (1988); Glenn R. Winters, A Half Century in
Retrospect, 72 JUDICATURE 92 (1988); John J. Hill, Jr., Taking Texas Judges Out
1994]
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person to serve as judge is not necessarily selected under either an
election or merit selection system, or any other process usually
mentioned. Quality is a subjective matter: one not easily defined.
It would be difficult to empirically prove that one system always
selects a better qualified judge than any other system.5 How any
individual person will actually serve as a judge is a prediction that
is impossible to make under any selection system. It is clear that
one's opinion on this matter reflects one's personal values and
philosophy about law and the judicial system.
Despite these caveats, it is my firm opinion that a merit selection
system based on the modified Missouri Plan 6 offers the best op-
portunity for, and on average results in, selection of an attorney
to serve as judge who has better professional credentials than the
election system would select. It was my feeling that as a group the
judges I saw selected under the merit selection plan had higher
professional credentials and proved to be better judges than the
of Politics: An Argument for Merit Election, 40 BAYLOR L. REV. 339 (1988); Stuart
Banner, Note, Disqualifying Elected Judges from Cases Involving Campaign Con-
tributors, 40 STAN. L. REV. 449 (1988); Lloyd B. Snyder, The Constitutionality
and Consequences of Restrictions on Campaign Speech by Candidates for Judicial
Office, 35 UCLA L. REV. 207 (1987); Philip L. Dubois, Accountability, Inde-
pendence, and the Selection of State Judges: The Role of Popular Judicial Elections,
40 Sw. L.J. 31 (Special Issue, May 1986); Richard A. Watson, Observations on
the Missouri Nonpartisan Court Plan, 40 Sw. L.J. 1 (Special Issue, May 1986);
Theodore McMillian, Selection of State Court Judges, 40 Sw. L.J. 9 (Special Issue,
May 1986); Anthony Champagne, The Selection and Retention of Judges in Texas,
40 Sv. L.J. 53 (Special Issue, May 1986); Roy A. Schotland, Elective Judges'
Campaign Financing: Are State Judges' Robes the Emperior's Clothes of American
Democracy?, 2 J.L. & POL. 57 (1985).
5. One author contends that the qualifications of merit selected judges are
indistinguishable from those of judges selected under an election system. Henry R.
,:., T r '-- a o,,, n,,,'1, of th Missouri Plan: Judicial Selection
in the Fifty States, 32 U. ML mi L. REV. 509 (1978). But see infra note 8. The
key to this debate is dependent upon how one defines quality. There are no
universally agreed upon standards. See Anthony Champagne, The Selection and
Retention of Judges in Texas, 40 Sw. L.J. 53, 111-13 (Special Issue, May 1986).
6. Popularly known as the Merit Plan or the Missouri Plan, named after the
first state to adopt the system in 1940. For a detailed discussion of the historical
development of the plan, see Madison B. McClellan, Note, Merit Appointment
Versus Popular Election: A Reformer's Guide to Judicial Selection Methods in
Florida, 43 FLA. L. REV. 529, 535-37 (1991); Norman Krivosha, In Celebration of
the 50th Anniversary of Merit Selection, 74 JUDICATURE 128 (1990); Glenn R.
Winters, The Merit Plan for Judicial Selection and Tenure-Its Historical Devel-
opment, 7 DUQ. L. REV. 61 (1968). Missouri uses the merit selection system only
for its supreme court, its court of appeals, and several circuit courts; all other
courts use the partisan election system to select and retain judges. 30 THE COUNCIL
OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 191 (1994) [hereinafter THE
BOOK OF STATES].
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prior elected group of judges. I can not quantitatively prove that
point. In addition, and I believe just as important, the merit selection
system functions with significantly lower societal costs7 than an
election system. Consequently, the law, the judiciary, and the judicial
system are benefitted by a merit selection system.
The primary reasons for change in a judicial selection system
are: (1) to obtain a better qualified, diversified judiciary; 8 (2) to
eliminate adverse practices and results; and (3) to improve the con-
fidence of the populace in the judicial system. It is my belief that
the merit selection process is best designed to accomplish these ends.
My conclusion is reached with full understanding that the merit
selection system is not without its problems and that some com-
mentators sincerely view this matter differently. 9 In this Article, I
will try to explain my rationale.
II. PRELIMINARY MATTERS
A. Selection Factors
When judicial selection processes are compared and analyzed,
primary emphasis ordinarily concerns the particular methods by which
judges are initially selected for their positions and how they are
retained in those positions. In actuality, however, the place of the
judiciary in relation to the political process depends on a large
number of other factors. 0 Not only are the particular initial selection
7. Within the term "costs" I am including economic, psychological, and ethical
considerations.
8. One study indicated that merit selection has had the effect of selecting more
professional judges and fewer politically active lawyers to the bench. John M.
Scheb, II, State Appellate Judges' Attitudes Toward Judicial Merit Selection and
Retention: Results of a National Survey, 72 JUDICATURE 170 (1988).
9. The current or modified versions of the election system have several ad-
vocates. See, e.g., Philip L. Dubois, Accountability, Independence, and the Selection
of State Judges: The Role of Popular Judicial Elections, 40 Sw. L.J. 31 (Special
Issue, May 1986) (advocating typical election system); Maura A. Schoshinski, Note,
Towards an Independent, Fair, and Competent Judiciary: An Argument for Im-
proving Judicial Elections, 7 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 839 (1994) (supporting a
financially and ethically structured election system); Madison B. McClellan, Note,
Merit Appointment Versus Popular Election: A Reformer's Guide to Judicial Se-
lection Methods in Florida, 43 FLA. L. REV. 529 (1991) (election preferred).
10. See Dubois, supra note 1, at 33; Robert P. Davidow, Beyond Merit Selection:
Judicial Careers Through Merit Promotion, 12 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 851, 868-86
(1981); Robert P. Davidow, Judicial Selection: The Search for Quality and Rep-
resentativeness, 31 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 409, 432-51 (1981); Lawrence E. Walsh,
The Attraction and Selection of Good District Court Judges, 39 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 33, 34-35 (1982).
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and retention systems significant, but the other rights, responsibilities,
and privileges that apply to judicial offices are also important. These
collateral factors include basic qualification standards," judicial
salaries, 2 term lengths, 3 ethical and disciplinary rules and procedures,
jurisdiction and stature of the judicial office,' 4 outside work
opportunities, 5 judicial office resources, 6 and the various factors
relating to retirement 7 and other fringe benefits. 8
These factors interrelate in various ways in the decision making
processes of all those who decide to seek and to stay in judicial
offices. Those persons who seek judicial office may respond to
different professional and personal stimuli. Some of these incentives
may be more important in more situations than others. A single
factor may be determinative for one individual and be of no
importance to another. For example, a position on the state supreme
11. Age and years of relevant experience are the primary criteria and may
disqualify some young or recent members of the bar; otherwise, these limitations
are not very important.
12. Regardless of the method used to select judges, the relative comparison of
judicial salaries to other comparable endeavors for lawyers is important in deter-
mining the quality and number of attorneys who may be interested in judicial
positions. Comparative salaries are crucial to the recruitment and retention of a
high quality judiciary. When states have allowed judicial salaries to become in-
adequate, the number of laywers who will seek judicial positions decreases, and
the number of sitting judges who leave the judiciary increases. See, e.g., MISsouRI
BAR ASSOCIATION SPECIAL COMMITTEE To REVIEW AND EVALUATE THE MISSOURI
NON-PARTISAN COURT PLAN, REPORT TO THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE MISSOURI
BAR (Jan. 15, 1986). In election selection systems, however, high judicial salaries
engender fiercely competitive elections.
13. Positions with longer terms are more desirable and therefore probably attract
a larger number of interested candidates. If a person considering whether to seek
a judicial position is going to give up her or his current professional activities, he
or she may evaluate the possibility of serving only a single term.
14. Obviously, appellate court positions may bc morc attractive to some lawyers
than trial court positions, and vice versa. Appellate court positions are generally
considered more prestigious and thus are more conveted.
15. Only part-time judicial positions permit outside practice or interactive pro-
fessional activity beyond volunteer work. The need to continue such endeavors may
disqualify some attorneys.
16. Whether the judicial position includes an adequate staff and budget for the
judge may be important.
17. When retirement may occur and when it is mandatory are both important
factors. For example, if retirement benefits do not vest until the judge serves more
than one term, the attorney considering a judicial office may be concerned about
the likelihood of reelection or retention. Retirement ages are the reverse of minimum
age qualifications for the positions. If one must retire at 70, attorneys who cannot
qualify for retirement benefits by the time they reach that age are not going to
seek judicial office. In other words, retirement age operates at a disqualifier.
18. Some matters related to pensions, such as dollar amount, vesting, and
survivorship protections, may be important.
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court, obviously, will attract a different pool of candidates than
would a trial judge or municipal judge position. Clearly, high salaries
for judicial positions, a phenomenon not prevalent in state court
systems, would also greatly affect the pool of candidates.
Aside from these important but peripheral factors, the selection
system for initial appointment of judges is probably the most important
factor for most persons who may seriously consider a judicial post.
For example, there are undoubtedly many attorneys who are well
qualified for judicial positions, but who will not seek judicial positions
if required to run in an election in order to initially obtain a judicial
office. 19 In other words, an election system is self-selecting 20 or,
19. A common phenomenon in elective systems states is that many judges become
judges initially by the appointment of the governor of the state. The recipient of
the appointment will then often run unopposed as an "incumbent judge" in his
first election. See David W. Case, In Search of an Independent Judiciary: Alternatives
to Judicial Elections in Mississippi, 13 Miss. C. L. REv. 1, 26 (1992); Anthony
Champagne, The Selection and Retention of Judges in Texas, 40 Sw. L.J. 53, 65-
67 (Special Issue, May 1986). In effect, the election system becomes an informal
appointment system without the benefit of the structural safeguards and quality
control of a formal merit system.
Although the current law in Arkansas prohibits those persons who are appointed
to fill out unexpired terms from succeeding themselves in the very position to
which they have been appointed, this restriction has been avoided in some situations.
ARK. CoNsT. amend. XXIX, §§ 1-2. There have been examples, particularly in
Pulaski County where multiple judgeships are up for election, where an appointed
judge will run as an "incumbent judge" either for another vacant similar judgeship,
or by arranging with a previously elected incumbent judge to switch judicial positions
with the appointed judge so that both judges can run as "incumbent judges."
Although this probably conforms to the letter of the law, it certainly does not
conform to the spirit of the law, which was to prohibit an appointed judge from
having an advantage in seeking elections to the positions to which the judge had
been appointed. Notwithstanding the merits of this avoidance technique, this ap-
proach certainly raises questions concerning the efficacy of the election system as
the initial appointment system.
One of the problems of the "cannot succeed" rule is that it effectively prevents
a governor from setting up an informal advisory panel to advise the chief executive
on judicial appointment matters. SeeCase, supra, at 26-29. The use of this informal
panel can metamorphose an otherwise traditional election system into a quasi-formal
merit selection plan, depending on the tenure of the governor and whether successor
governors retain it.
20. See Case, supra note 19, at 10-11. Mr. Case concluded:
The expensive and contentious political climate which permeates partisan
elections may also deter highly qualified and desirable candidates from
seeking judicial office. An elected judge's equivocal job security, inadequate
compensation, the continual campaigning and participation in competitive
politics, and a system that rewards the politically skillful, rather than those
with superior judicial credentials, are among the factors that discourage
many well-qualified lawyers from pursuing an elective judgeship. This is
said to create "an implicit self-selection effect" that eliminates many of
the most qualified before the selection process even begins. Case, supra
1994]
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more accurately, self-disqualifying. For the reasonably qualified
attorney, a merit selection system possesses fewer factors that will
discourage candidacy for a judicial office. 2' Consequently, the pool
of potential attorneys, although somewhat different in composition, 22
should be a larger pool than the pool of attorneys who would seek
judicial office through an election system. In turn, a larger pool
should provide a base for attracting better candidates and assumably
better judges.
B. Policy Issues in Contention
The major contentions over what is the best method of selecting
judges center on one's opinion concerning the following attributes
of the system:
1. the degree to which judicial selection should be separated
from the pressures of political processes;
2. the degree to which an election process should be part of
the selection processes; 2a
3. the degree to which any selection method imposes undue costs
and inefficiencies on the judicial system without comparable
benefits;
4. the degree to which any selection method imposes strains on
the ethical stature of the judicial system without comparable
benefits;
5. the degree to which any particular selection method adversely
affects the number and quality of the candidate pool; 4 and,
note 19, at 10-11 (footnotes omitted); see also John D. Felice & John D.
Kilwein, Strike One, Strike Two .. .: The History of and Prospect for
Judicial Reform in Ohio, 75 JUDICATURE 193, 196 (1992); PHInP L. DuBois,
FROM BALLOT TO BENCH: JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AND THE QUEST FOR Ac-
COUNTABI-TYrr_ 24 (1980).
21. See supra note 8.
22. A merit selection system may and should discourage attorneys from
participating who do not have good professional reputations or who have
had ethical difficulties. Unfortunately, election systems have sometimes
had the opposite result. Candidates with undistinguished careers and even
ethical committee reprimands have been elected because of the electorate's
interests in nonqualification criteria. See infra note 69.
23. "It may be that society accepts the goal of accountability for judges
without recognizing its meaning like the voters in the study in Lubbock
who did not know anything about the judges for whom they were voting,
but liked the idea of voting for them." Anthony Champagne, The Selection
and Retention of Judges in Texas, 40 Sw. L.J. 53, 117 (Special Issue,
May 1986) (citing Johnson et al., The Salience of Judicial Candidates and
Elections, 59 Soc. Sci. Q. 371, 376 (1978)).
24. One commentator succinctly states the problem: "The Model Code
[Vol. 17:281
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6. the degree to which any selection method adversely affects
or limits the diversity of those who participate in the selection
processes.
The general aims of a judicial selection method 25 can be
summarized as follows:
1. to assure judicial independence;
2. to recruit the highest quality judiciary;
3. to provide for accountability;
4. to create a representative judiciary; and,
5. to maintain public confidence in the fairness and integrity
of the judicial system.
C. Principal Selection Systems
There are a variety of selection methods that are used by the
various states.2 6 The principal groupings of methods include the
following:
1. partisan elections
a. for all courts, and
b. for selected courts;
2. nonpartisan elections
a. for all courts, and
b. for selected courts;
3. merit selection through a nomination committee (commission)
and executive selection with a subsequent retention election
for term continuation;"7
of Judicial Conduct imposes requirements, such as independence and fair-
ness, that are simply incompatible with judicial elections." Maura A.
Schoshinski, Note, Towards an Independent, Fair, and Competent Judi-
ciary: An Argument for Improving Judicial Elections, 7 GEO.J. LEGAL
ETmCs 839 (1994).
25. See Dubois, supra note 1, at 32-33.
26. Anthony Champagne, The Selection and Retention of Judges in
Texas, 40 Sw. L.J. 53, 57-65 (Special Issue, May 1986). One commentator
observed: "Today there is an almost endless combination of schemes used
to select judges. Almost no two states are alike and few employ the same
method for choosing judges at all levels of their judiciary." DUBOIS, supra
note 20, at 6. For a summary of the selection systems for all states and
principal jurisdictions in this country, see THE BOOK OF STATES, supra
note 6, at 190-92.
27. This system is most commonly referred to as the modified Missouri
Plan. See supra note 6.
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4. executive selection with legislative consent and service until
impeachment, retirement, or death.2 8
Because this Article is concerned only with a comparison of the
Wyoming merit selection system and the Arkansas election system,
the scope of this Article will include only the relative merit of these
two systems for the selection of judges.
III. THE WYOMING MERIT SELECTION PROCESS
29
A. Description of the Process
Prior to the 1972 constitutional amendment to its judicial article,
all of Wyoming's judges including justices of the peace, district
judges (the equivalent of Arkansas's circuit or chancery judges), and
supreme court justices were selected by nonpartisan elections. The
amendment and related statutes adopted a locally customized version30
of the modified Missouri Plan for the selection of all judges in the
county courts,3" district courts,3 2 and the supreme court." The justices
28. This briefly describes the method used to select Federal Article III
judges. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2; U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 1. Several states
used similar approahes. Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Rhode
Island select at least a portion of their judiciary in this manner. See THE
BOOK OF STATES, supra note 6, at 190-92. This system totally reeks of
politics in the selection stage of the process, but after appointment possesses
the most protection against political interference and, consequently, is
devoid of realistic accountability. Many consider the federal judiciary to
be better qualified as a whole than are state judiciaries as a whole. It is
not entirely clear that the selection process has much to do with that
result. It is important to recognize that federal judges are paid significantly
high salaries, have greater resources, possess greater prestige, and have a
better retirement plan than state judges do and thus it is arguable that a
higher qualified pool of hopefuls seeks these positions. It is extremely
doubtful that any state would now adopt a system of this nature considering
the electortate's general dissatisfaction with federal judges who are perceived
as interfering with state policy and activities.
29. The relevant portions of the Wyoming Constitution dealing with
the judicial selection process are reproduced as Appendix A to this Article.
30. WYo. CoNsT. art. V, § 4; see infra Appendix A.
3 1. By statute, county court judges are selected under the merit selection
plan contained in the Wyoming Constitution. The statute provides:
Judges of the county court shall be nonpartisan, shall be nominated and
appointed and retained as provided by article 5, section 4, Wyoming
Constitution.
WYo. STAT. § 5-5-111 (1977). The county courts were created in 1971 as an option
to the justice of the peace courts. Counties with populations greater than 30,000
were required to create county courts. For counties with fewer than 30,000 people,
the option to create a county court rests in the discretion of the relevant county
[Vol. 17:281
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of the peace ("J.P.s") remained elected. Because J.P.s do not have
to be lawyers, many believed that there was no justification for
including them in what is in effect a selecting process applicable to
attorneys. In addition, the J.P.s have very limited jurisdiction and
are gradually being replaced with county judges who are selected
under the merit selection plan.1
4
The merit selection system adopted in Wyoming is a standard
commission system. The Judicial Nominating Commission consists
of seven members.35 Three members must be members of the bar
engaged in active practice. They are elected by the Wyoming State
Bar.16 Three lay members, who must not be admitted to practice
law, are appointed by the Governor. In addition, the chief justice,
government office. Once created, unity courts supplant justice of the peace courts.
A relevant statute provides:
(a) The board of county commissioners of any county with a population
of more than thirty thousand (30,000) inhabitants according to the latest
official federal census of the United States shall establish a county court.
County courts shall be established on January 1 next succeeding the year
in which the census demonstrates a population of more than thirty thousand
(30,000) in the county.
(b) The judicial salaries, salaries of the clerical staff, supplies, operating
costs, jury and witness expenses and other expenses of the county court
shall be paid by the state.
WYo. STAT. § 5-5-102 (1977). Another statute provides:
(a) In counties in this state which have a population of less than thirty
thousand (30,000), according to the latest official federal census, the board
of county commissions may establish a county court in their county by
the adoption of a resolution establishing the same. Within ten (10) days
after the adoption of such a resolution the board of county commissioners
shall file certified copies of such resolution with the clerk of the supreme
court of Wyoming, with the director of the state department of audit and
with the clerk of the district court of the county.
(b) The judicial salaries, salaries of the clerical staff, supplies, operating
costs, jury and witness expenses and other expenses of the county court
may be paid by the state. The effective date of the state financing of a
county court pursuant to this subsection shall be the first day of the next
biennial fiscal period unless otherwise authorized by the legislature.
WYo. STAT. § 5-5-103 (1977). A related provision states:
In any county in which a county court is established, the county court
shall supplant and replace the justice of peace courts of the county and
shall exercise the jurisdiction previously exercised by the justice of peace
courts.
WYO. STAT. § 5-5-105 (1977).
32. WYo. CoNsT. art. V, § 4(b); see infra Appendix A.
33. WYo. CONST. art. V, § 4(b); see infra Appendix A.
34. See supra note 31.
35. WYo. CONST. art. V, § 4(c); see infra Appendix A.
36. The state bar is an integrated bar, which means that all licensed attorneys
must be members; consequently, it includes all attorneys in the state.
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or the chief justice's designee, is a member and serves as chair of
the Commission. All members must be residents of Wyoming, and
no more than two members may be residents of the same judicial
district during any term of service." Except for the chief justice,
all commissioners serve staggered four year3" terms.3 9 After serving
a full term a member is not eligible for reelection or reappointment
and thus cannot serve consecutive terms in the same position on
the Commission.4 Membership vacancies are filled for unexpired
terms in the same manner as original appointments.4 1
The system attempts to diminish a commissioner's potential
conflict of interest and sensitivity to the undue influence of certain
persons with political power or influence such as the governor. The
provisions specifically discourage political favors to and political
activity of commissioners. No member of the commission, except
of course the ex-officio chief justice, can hold any federal, state,
or county public office or any political party office. 42 In addition,
no member is eligible for appointment to any judicial office while
that person is a member of the Commission and until a period of
one year has passed after the expiration of that term for which he
or she was elected or appointed. Commissioners serve without
compensation for their work, except they may receive per diem
expenses incurred for travel and subsistence while attending
Commission meetings.4 3
37. The Wyoming Constitution has a provision dealing with the situation in
which the Commission must select a judge for judicial district that is not represented
by a commissioner. Wyo. CONST. art. V, § 4(c); see infra Appendix A. Chief
Justice Golden of the Wyoming Supreme Court reports that the representative
advisors mandated by the constitution participate in all the processes leading up
to the vote. Interview with Michael Golden. Chief Justice of the Wyoming Supreme
Court (Nov. 2, 1994). After conveying their opinions concerning the candidates,
however, they are excluded from the room while the voting process of the Com-
mission takes place.
38. WYo. STAT. § 5-1-102(a) (1977).
39. WYo. CONST. art. V, § 4(c); see infra Appendix A.
40. The one term limit may seem unduly restrictive, but it is designed to reduce
the possibility that members who would otherwise serve consecutive multiple terms
might be able to exercise dominance over other commissioners or, worse, build a
power base from which influences over judgeships could be informally exercised.
Although there is arguably a need to have experienced members, the terms are
staggered and the Commission has orientation sessions every year to assist new
members in understanding their tasks.
41. WYo. CoNsT. art. V, § 4(d); see infra Appendix A.
42. WYo. CoNsT. art. V, § 4(d); see infra Appendix A.
43. The relevant statute provides:
(b) The members of the judicial nominating commission, including any
advisors, shall not receive any fees, salary or other compensation for
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Upon the existence of a vacancy" in the office of justice or
judge in any of the covered courts, the Commission must circulate
information concerning the vacancy and the procedure for making
application. All members of the Commission review all applications.
If a large number of applications are received, the Commission
reduces the group to approximately twenty or twenty-five candidates.
These candidates are interviewed before the entire Commission for
twenty to twenty-five minutes. After each interview the commissioners
individually express their opinions and reactions concerning the
interviewee. After all of the remaining applicants are interviewed,
the members of the Commission determine by voice vote who the
three nominees will be;. the chief justice votes only in order to break
a tie. These nominees' names and files are then forwarded to the
Governor for the Governor's selection from the three nominees.
In practice, regardless of the cause of the judicial vacancy, the
entire process will be completed within ninety days from the date
of the vacancy. The Commission's list of nominees must be presented
to the Governor no later than 60 days after the date of vacancy.45
The Governor has thirty days to select a nominee." The Governor
must select from the list, cannot add other names, and cannot ask
the Commission to nominate other persons.4 7 If the Governor fails
or refuses to act, the chief justice selects the judge from the list
presented to the Governor.
At the next general election following one full year of service
as judge or justice, each newly selected justice or judge who wishes
to remain as judge must stand for retention in office on a ballot
that submits to the appropriate electorate" the question whether the
services rendered but are entitled to receive per diem and mileage on the
same basis and at the same rate as state employees and reimbursement
for any other actual and necessary expenses incurred in the performance
of commission duties.
WYO. STAT. § 5-1-102(b) (1977); see Wyo. CONST. art. V, § 4(e); infra Appendix
A.
44. A vacancy may be caused by death, retirement, tender of resignation,
removal, failure of an incumbent to file a declaration of candidacy, or certifications
of a negative majority vote on the question of retention in office. WYo. CONST.
art. V, § 4(b); see infra Appendix A.
45. WYo. CoNsT. art. V, § 4(b); see infra Appendix A.
46. The plan provides that if the Governor fails to select a judge within a
period of 30 days from the date of the submission of the list, the appointment
must be made by the chief justice from that list within 15 days. To date, however,
the Governor has always made the appointment within the allotted time.
47. WYo. CONST. art. V, § 4(b); see infra Appendix A.
48. The electorate for supreme court justices is the entire state, the electorate
for district judges is the judicial district in which they serve, and the electorate
for other covered judges is the geographical area over which their jurisdiction
extends. Wyo. CONST. art. V, § 4(g); see infra Appendix A.
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justice or judge will be retained in office for another term or partial
term.49 In addition, this retention ballot procedure must be conducted
at the general election held in the last year of each term for each
judge.50 To stand for retention, the judge must file a declaration
of candidacy not more than six months nor fewer than three months
before the general election.' If a justice or judge fails to file the
declaration within the time specified, or if a majority of those voting
on the question vote negatively to any judicial candidacy, a vacancy
is created in that office at the end of the defeated judge's existing
term.5
2
B. Interview With Wyoming Chief Justice Michael Golden"
Because I have not lived in Wyoming for over fourteen years,
I thought it would be useful to discuss with a resident lawyer the
recent experience under the merit selection system. Accordingly, I
had a two hour telephone conversation with a former student of
mine and friend, Michael Golden, who currently serves as Chief
Justice of the Wyoming Supreme Court. Justice Golden graduated
from law school in 1967, and after a tour of duty in the Army
JAG, settled into private practice in Wyoming. He was an outstanding
law student, serving as Editor in Chief of the Land & Water Law
Review, and he built an outstanding reputation as a practitioner.
With these impeccable professional and personal credentials, he was
selected in 1988 by then Governor Michael Sullivan from a list of
three attorneys to serve as a justice of the Wyoming Supreme Court.
He has been retained by the electorate in both of his retention
elections. He is clearly a representative of how exceptionally well
the merit selection system can work. I have the highest regard for
his ability and opinion.
49. Wyo. CONST. art. V, § 4(g); see infra Appendix A.
50. Wyo. CONST. art. V, § 4(g); see infra Appendix A.
51. Wyo. CONST. art. V, § 4(h); see infra Appendix A.
52. Wyo. CONST. art. V, § 4(h); see infra Appendix A. Some states that use
retention elections have increased the percentage necessary for retention to greater
than 5007o. The Illinois Constitution, for example, requires voter approval by at
least 6007o of the votes cast. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 12(d); see Lefkovitz v. State
Bd. of Elections, 400 F. Supp. 1005, 1006 (N.D. Ill. 1975)k, aff'd, 424 U.S. 901
(1976); Sixty Per Cent Retention Vote Upheld in Illinois, 59 JUDICATURE 256, 256
(1975).
53. The following discussion concerns remarks made by Chief Justice Michael
Golden of the Wyoming Supreme Court, Interview with Michael Golden, Chief
Justice of the Wyoming Supreme Court (Nov. 2, 1994).
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Much of the two hour conversation concerned the nonretention
votes for two judges during the 1992 election.54 One judge was a
justice of the supreme court and the other was a district judge. The
reasons for these votes and their consequences are of obvious concern
to the judiciary in Wyoming.
As far as reasons were concerned, both judges had more or
less organized opposition from different lay groups. In both cases,
the lay opposition was concerned about judicial decisions that the
respective judges had made. In neither case were there contentions
of incompetence, misconduct, or lack of diligence. Clearly, on the
surface, these two elections represent the type of interference with
judicial processes that many contend or fear adversely affect judicial
independence. On the other hand, both cases apparently had a more
or less silent undertow of other concerns. In both cases, bar support
was partially divided with both judges coming under criticism from
some lawyers for problems with certain elements of their styles or
performances. Without solid bar support, judges may be more at
risk in their retention elections. 5
54. In 1992 the two judges who were not retained were Justice Walter C.
Urbright, Jr. of the Wyoming Supreme Court and James N. Wolfe, a district
judge. Two other judges have also not been retained. In both of those cases,
opposition by some members of the bar was insignificant. They were District Judge
John P. Ilsley in 1974 and District Judge Paul T. Liamos in 1984. Judge Ilsley
was a holdover judge from the election system. His so-called "judicial temperament"
had angered numerous lawyers and citizens who had appeared before him in his
court. Judge Liamos was another holdover who had received overwhelming support
in his first retention election. This election is discussed thoroughly in a law review
article on which the following discussion is based. See Michael J. Horan & Kenyon
N. Griffin, Ousting the Judge: Campaign Politics in the 1984 Wyoming Judicial
Retention Election, 24 LAND & WATER L. Rzv. 371 (1989). The problems developed
during Judge Liamos's second term. Id. at 377. He had adopted court management
practices that displeased many lawyers. Id. While some believed that Judge Liamos
imposed overly harsh sentences, others thought that he was too lenient on criminals.
Id. at 378. A campaign against him developed, the result of which was a 57o
vote against retention. Id. In contrast, five other district judges who also ran in
their districts during that year receive an average vote of eighty percent in favor
of retention. In the Liamos election, voter interest was high and exercised. More
people, in the relevant geographical area, voted in this retention election than in
the presidential race. Id. at 379.
55. It is significant to note that in the 1992 election, three other district judges
ran for retention and were successful. Although there were not organized opposition
forces against these three candidates, the retention versus nonretention percentages
were different for each position. In one county that voted for three of the judges,
one supreme court and two district judges, the supreme court justice's vote county
equaled 450o for retention and 55%o against, while the two district judges received
respectively, 59o for retention and 41% against, and 66% for retention and 34%
against. Secretary of State, State of Wyoming, Official Vote-General Election,
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Chief Justice Golden feels that nonretention elections that seem
to focus either in whole or part on judicial decisions and not on
conduct are a real threat to independent judicial decision making.
As much as one may try to discount the affect of these elections,
the fear is that subconsciously one may weigh public opinion in
one's decision making. The real problem is not with retention elections,
but with any election system that is applicable to judicial selection
or retention. Chief Justice Golden feels that because the federal
judicial selection model of appointment with no elections is an
unrealistic political goal, the retention election system is far superior
to the contested election system present in states such as Arkansas.
Despite his concerns about the retention election rejections, Chief
Justice Golden firmly believes the merit selection system has worked
extremely well. As chief justice, he presides over the Commission,
and during his tenure as the presiding officer, he feels the
commissioners have been extremely diligent, dedicated, and ethical
in their task to select the names that are transmitted to the Governor.
He does not believe that back-room politics has played a significant
part in the process.
IV. MERIT SELECTION VERSUS ELECTION SELECTION-ANALYsIs
AND COMPARISON
A. General Observations
The merit system in Wyoming has exhibited over the last twenty
years all the strengths and weaknesses of a judicial selection system.
The system has resulted in the development of a diligent, competent,
and professional judiciary. Whether judge by judge it is better than
the judiciary that existed under the old election system is not
quantifiably determinable. Without question and with only a few
exceptions, the amount of money spent on campaigns has nearly
disappeared, and clearly the time and effort that judges must spend
on campaigning has decreased to near zero. The time delay in
replacing judges has also been reduced to a minimum. The selection
processes are efficient, fair, and respectable.
On the other hand, four judges have not been retained by the
electorate, and at least in some of these elections the judges' decisions
November 3, 1992 (1993). Approximately the same number of votes were cast in
all three elections. It is difficult to understand what these statistical differences
mean. It is fair to state that some voters were very discriminate in their voting
pattern for these judgeships, whether or not the discrimination was made for the
right or wrong reasons.
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in individual cases appear to have been significant factors in their
defeat. This raises questions concerning the issue of judicial
independence. Perhaps politics has even played a part in the selection
of some of the judges. But both of these detrimental happenings
occur many more times under the election system too, and they are
inherent burdens imposed on any system of judge selection or retention
and particularly on ones that include a public election process.
B. Contested and Uncontested Elections versus Retention
Elections
Before Wyoming adopted the merit selection system, its judges
faced many of the same issues with its nonpartisan system as Arkansas
now faces with its partisan election system. The principal arguments
for an election system are as follows: 1) elections are open, public
events; 2) elections incorporate our republican tradition; 3) elections
produce a voter-selected representative and accountable judiciary;56
4) elections provide a means to educate the public about judicial
candidates; and 5) as elected officials, the judges possess greater
political stature and credibility. Unfortunately, the election system
does not deliver what it promises. Under every circumstance that
can arise, the contested election system for judicial selection and
retention has disadvantages.
If elections were the result of the considered opinion of the
electorate, the election of judges might be a greatly preferred technique.
Experience and empirical research unfortunately inform us that this
is not the case.57 The vast majority of voters in judicial elections
are not adequately informed about the candidates. Consequently,
voters typically make decisions based on very nonprofessional and
meritless considerations, including a candidate's campaign promises,58
56. It is arguable whether voters actually are making most of these selections.
In many selections by election states, judges are frequently appointed by the
appointment authority to fill out a term, then run for reelection and usually win.
JEROME R. CORSI, JUDICIAL POLITIcs-AN INTRODUCTION 110 (1984); see Kurt E.
Scheuerman, Comment, Rethinking Judicial Elections, 72 OR. L. REV. 459, 476
(1993).
57. See Dubois, supra note 1.
58. The issue of campaign promises in judicial races is one of the most difficult
informational problems raised. To take a firm position on a point of public policy
similar to candidates for legislative and administrative positions would run afoul
of the judicial principles of impartiality, fairness, and open-mindedness. The Judicial
Code of Conduct attempts to restrict judicial candidates in this regard. See infra
note 91.
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occupational ballot label,59 public image, perceptions of the candidate
to the electorate,60 political party, 6' sex or race,62 the familiarity of
the name, 63 or the recommendations of the newspaper or other media.
59. Dubois, supra note 1, at 45. The author states:
Recent research conducted on nonpartisan judicial elections confirms that
where an occupational ballot label is provided voters are most likely to
rely heavily upon it in making a voting choice. Incumbents and other
individuals holding "judicial" positions are most favored, followed by
individuals bearing labels such as deputy district attorney, city attorney,
and so forth. Indeed, occupational ballot labels were found generally to
be far more influential in affecting voter choice than bar and newspaper
endorsements, the voters' pamphlet, the candidates' own publicity efforts
as indicated by campaign spending, and other ballot cues to be found in
the candidates' names (e.g., sex, ethnicity).
Dubois, supra note 1, at 45. (footnotes omitted); see Philip L. Dubois, Voting
Cues in Nonpartisan Trial Court Elections: A Multivariate Assessment, 18 L. &
Soc'y REv. 395, 404-05 (1984).
Arkansas limits the use of occupational ballot names to the position currently
held by the candidate. This means an incumbent judge can run as "judge," but
a prior one cannot. Arkansas law provides:
(c) Any person who shall file for any elective office in this state may
use not more than three (3) given names, one of which may be a nickname
or any other word used for the purpose of identifying such persons to
the voters and may add as a prefix to his name the title or an abbreviation
of an elective public office the person holds. The name of every candidate
shall be printed on the ballot in the same form as the candidate signed
the political practice pledge. No candidate shall be permitted to change
the form in which his name will be printed on the ballot after the deadline
for filing the political practice pledge.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-7-305(c) (Michie 1993). This section was amended in 1991.
The amendment substituted "the title or an abbreviation of an elective public office
the person holds" for "an abbreviation of any professional title which he has a
legal right to use." Compare ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-7-305(c) (Michie 1993) with
ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-7-305(c) (Michie 1987) (amended 1991).
60. See infra note 82 and accompanying text.
61. A New York study indicated that 39%, the single highest identified factor,
of the electorate voted for judges on the basis of party affiliation. This is relevant
in a two party state, but lacks importance where the only contested election is in
the party primary. There are those who argue that this voter preference may be
a rational method of making a choice if political and philosophical differences
exist between the party candidates. Dubois, supra note 1, at 42.
62. The Voting Rights Act may require this as more "safe" districts for minority
candidates are created. See Thomas P. Prehoditch, The Voting Rights Act and
Judicial Selection Litigation: An Evaluation of Remedial Options, 11 REv. Lrrio.
523 (1992).
63. See Madison B. McClellan, Note, Merit Appointment Versus Popular Elec-
tion: A Reformer's Guide to Judicial Selection Methods in Florida, 43 FLA. L.
REv. 529 (1991). The author observed:
[Imn popular urban areas, judicial elections may reflect popularity and
name recognition more than competency. For example, in Dade County,
Florida, MacKenzie, a female judicial candidate possessing no courtroom
experience, ran against Dellapa, an acclaimed judge. One month before
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Recommendations of the media, if based on substantive criteria,
may be the best reference point mentioned, but this is clearly not
the preferred basis of a judicial selection decision. In fact, these
recommendations may themselves be based on one or more of the
other nonprofessional bases.
At the extremes, judicial election system either intrude on
impartiality and judicial independence or are void of electorate
accountability. If a judgeship is contested, there is a real possibility
that candidates will partake in legal issue and policy debates6 or
will attack particular decisions of incumbents or courts. This type
of campaigning offends general judicial concerns for impartiality,
objectivity, and fairness, but is a natural result of contested elections.
At the other extreme, uncontested elections, though safe from
the evils of contested campaigns, suffer from irrelevance and are
void of republican concepts of accountability. Under election selection
systems, once an office is filled by election, there are seldom any
opponents for the judge in subsequent elections.6 5 Consequently, the
so called "election" is illusory: it is no election at all. One might
view this as recognition of the judge's good work, but it is usually
representative of the problem that lawyers have in seeking election
against an incumbent judge. The lack of an opponent is seldom a
result of superior performance by the incumbent, but is more likely
a result of the inherent barriers judicial candidates face against
incumbent judges and the potential disadvantage the loser may feel
the election, a Mimai Herald article related MacKenzie's lack of experience
and her recent bout with alcoholism. MacKenzie won by a comfortable
25,000 votes. An "all-American" name and subsequent newspaper exposure
may aid a candidate, despite the article's content.
Id. at 556-57 (footnotes omitted).
64. This may become a greater problem if more courts hold that the judicial
ethics restrictions on campaigning are unconstitutional. See infra notes 92-99 and
accompanying text.
65. See James D. Gingerich & Warren Readnour, The 1990 Arkansas Judicial
Elections: Much Ado About Nothing?, ARK. LAW, July 1992, at 37, 38 (noting
that incumbents ran unopposed in 70% of the judicial races in 1990 and in 8801o
of the races between 1976-88). In the 1994 general election, a pitiful 6% of the
races were contested. There were only 4 contested judicial elections out of 69 races.
Secretary of State, 1994 Election Candidates Filed with Secretary of State (Sept.
24, 1994). One supreme court justice and two court of appeals judges ran without
opposition in both the primary and the general election. If there is no decision
for the electorate to make, why have elections? Although retention elections may
produce the same results, all voters who decide to vote in judicial races actually
have a choice-retain or don't retain.
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in representing clients before the victorious incumbent. 6 Most lawyers
who would be eligible or would want a position practice before the
incumbent judge. To be that judge's judicial opponent can cause
grave concerns, real or perceived, on the part of a losing lawyer
and his or her clients. Again, the system is perceptually corrupted
by the election process.
The fact that few will run against incumbent judges also rebuts
one of the primary justifications for a contestable election system
to select judges. It is difficult to defend the election process on the
basis that the electorate should have the opportunity to make the
decision about whom its judges should be when there is no decision
to be made. Uncontested elections are hardly elections.
Even if the extreme circumstances are not applicable and one
is analyzing a contested race that avoids impartiality and judicial
independence issues, the process still fails to attain its goals. The
campaigns will be devoid of debate over the highly relevant policy
and decision issues. Thus the election usually will be determined by
nonqualification criteria such as cleverness of the ad campaigns or
the electorate's perceptions of the respective candidates. 67 Add to
this the general disinterest the electorate has in judicial election and
you have a process that is not worth the effort and costs.
The merit selection system cuts through these problems. First,
there are no contested elections to stimulate the type of controversy
that undermines impartiality and judicial independence. Second, there
still is public accountability because the electorate has an opportunity
to vote for or against a judge in every retention election: there are
no unopposed candidates. In contrast to unopposed elections, the
merit selection system makes a consequential election automatic and
meaningful. Although the electorate is not faced with a choice of
candidates, it is faced with a decision of whether the sitting judge
has adequately performed her or his judicial position. This is very
relevant to the electorate and, when a judge's performance is in
dispute, is taken seriously by the electorate.6
Another problem that is inherent in any judicial election system
is the occurrence of frivolous contests. Sometimes certain attorneys,
for a wide range of reasons, will run against well regarded incumbent
66. See Robert F. Utter, Selection and Retention-A Judge's Perspective, 48
WASH. L. REv. 839, 843 (1973).
67. For a discussion of some of the campaign techniques in issueless judicial
elections, see Anthony Champagne, The Selection and Retention of Judges in Texas,
40 Sw. L.J. 53, 99-100 (Special Issue, May 1986).
68. See supra note 54.
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judges merely for the purpose of public exposure and to improve
notoriety. These occurrences have two harmful effects. First, the
incumbent cannot assume victory and must expend time, money,
and energy to defend reelection. 9 Second, sometimes the challenger
wins regardless of merit. 70
These results cannot occur under the merit selection system.
One would not submit an application and thus seek a nomination
from the selection commission without an intent and desire for the
position. Moreover, even if a well-qualified incumbent is not retained,
however unfortunate this is, the replacement will be chosen by the
selection commission on the basis of merit and desire.
The problems of an under-informed electorate need to be resolved
with education programs sponsored by the bar and hopefully supported
by the media. In addition, there is no denying that special interest
groups can organize and campaign against certain judges on particular
legal issues or decisions. These campaigns can make it difficult on
a judge in a particular retention election. Bar support for the judge
is essential. If this support is divided or weak, the judge may be
in trouble. This risk is an inherent part of any election system
whether it involves contested races or merely retention elections. 7'
69. The incumbent fears that the electorate will not properly discriminate between
candidates on the basis of experience, competence, and ability. A true story will
illustrate this point. During the time when Wyoming elected its judges, a friend
of mine was discussing the upcoming elections with an acquaintance. The issue of
judicial races arose, and my friend asked the acquaintance for whom she was going
to vote in a race for the supreme court. For that office there were two candidates,
one incumbent and one person who ran for supreme court every time there was
a vacancy. The aspiring justice's name was John J. Spriggs and he was a malcontent
who many thought was unqualified to be a justice of the supreme court. The
acquaintance responded, "Oh, I am voting for Mr. Spriggs." The friend, astonished,
blurted out, "Why?" The acquaintance explained, "Well, Mr. Spriggs has to run
every two years, and the others only have to run every six. I feel sorry for him
and so I am going to vote for him." For more stories concerning Mr. Spriggs,
see Michael Golden, Journey for the Pole: The Life and Times of Fred H. Blum,
Justice of the Wyoming Supreme Court, 28 LAND & WATER L. REv.-PT. 2 511,
550-60 (1993).
70. A very similar scenario actually occurred in Wyoming prior to the adoption
of the merit selection system. A well regarded but aging justice of the supreme
court was defeated by a relatively unknown attorney who many understood was
running primarily to gain exposure for his practice. There were indications that he
was never comfortable in his new position. Later, after the organization of the
merit selection system, he submitted his name for consideration for a district
judgeship. A district judgeship was one for which he had an interest and in which
he would be comfortable. The Governor appointed him to the district court upon
the understanding that he resign from the supreme court; he did so and stayed in
the judiciary.
71. See infra text accompanying note 103.
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C. Judges, Money, and Campaigning
A major problem of the election selection system is the election
process itself. Campaigns take time, money, and personnel.7 2 The
monetary costs of the election systems are too high, unnecessary,
ethically corruptible, and impose serious adverse harm on the entire
judicial system. The monetary costs to the candidate in an election
system are purely economic dead weight. Other than the financial
support provided to printers, the postal services, the advertising
media, and campaign workers, if any are paid, the pay back to the
judicial system for the expenditures is nonexistent or even results
in a negative balance. Whereas contributions to the campaign of
legislative and executive candidates may result in the contributor
gaining a supporter in the particular office if that candidate wins,
support for a winning judicial candidate must ethically be ignored
by the judge or a serious conflict of interest may arise either in
particular litigation or by a desired rule of law or procedure.
Significant percentages of campaign funding come from lawyers
and potential litigants.73 Judges know who their supporters are
notwithstanding attempts to separate the judge from some of these
activities. If a judicial candidate must obtain campaign funding and
assistance, and if this money and support must come from potential
litigants or lawyers who will practice before the judge's court, the
perception of favoritism is undeniable and unavoidable. Instantly,
suspicions of conflict of interest and influence issues are raised if
contributors have cases before the judge for whom they made a
campaign contribution.7 4 Suspicions of favoritism are magnified if
72. Compared to other political races, judicial elections are usually underfunded,
understaffed, and poorly organized. See Roy A. Schotland, Elective Judges' Cam-
paign Financing: Are State Judges' Robes the Emperor's Clothes qf American
Democracy?, 2 J.L. & POL. 57, 110 (1985).
73. Stuart Banner, Note, Disqualifying Elected Judges From Cases Involving
Campaign Contributors, 40 STAN. L. REV. 449, 470-74 (1988); Schotland, supra
note 72, at 110-20.
74. Contributions to judicial campaigns have been cause for motions for recusal
of a judge. Anthony Champagne, The Selection and Retention of Judges in Texas,
40 Sw. L.J. 53, 87-88 (Special Issue, May 1986). The author stated:
In some highly publicized cases, the receipt of large contributions has led
lawyers to try to disqualify judges from sitting in cases in which contributors
are involved. Attorneys for Texaco, for example, argued that the first
district judge assigned to the multi-billion dollar suit between Texaco and
Pennzoil should be disqualified from hearing the case because he received
a $10,000 contribution from one of Pennzoil's lawyers. Another example
of an effort to disqualify judges involved a case in which attorneys argued
before the Supreme Court that three justices should be disqualified because
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the contributor wins. It makes no difference whether the possibly
wrongful conduct is ever litigated or matures into a full fledged
controversy. Many lawyers and litigants perceive favoritism as a
problem whether it actually exists or not.7" For those working in
the system and their clients, the system is corrupt. This belief
desecrates the foundational mainstays of the judicial system: fairness
and impartiality. The perception of corruption of the judiciary by
the election process is the election system's most serious fault. This
alone justifies the removal or alteration of this method of judicial
selection. But there are other problems as well.
Many, including myself, believe that there is no adequately
safeguardable campaign funding system feasible as an alternative to
financial support of judicial candidates by lawyers or other private
citizens. The suggestion of public financing, although attractive to
some, carries with it costs that few, if any, states will support.7 6 In
addition, it only resolves the financial conflict of interest issue
between the elected judge and outside contributors. It does not
resolve the other serious problems raised by the election system in
regard to funding of campaigns.
they had received large contributions from the opposing party in the case,
Clinton Manges.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
After a thorough study of a Texas campaign, another commentator concluded:
The strongest conclusion that can be drawn from this research and from
the controversy in Texas over judicial selection is that partisan elections,
coupled with the extant system of campaign financing, create at least the
appearance of impropriety and probably the occasional reality. The patterns
we have shown-of lawyers on opposite sides of the docket contributing
to their respective judicial champions-has nothing to recommend it, at
least if we take seriously the ideal of judicial impartiality.
Donald W. Jackson & James W. Riddlesperger, Jr., Money and Politics in Judicial
Elections: The 1988 Election of the Chief Justice of the Texas Supreme Court, 74
JUDICATURE 184, 189 (1991).
One commentator urged that upon the motion of a noncontributing party, a
judge should be automatically disqualified if the nonmoving party contributed to
the judge in the case in excess of a specified amount, such as $1,000. Stuart
Banner, Note, Disqualifying Elected Judges from Cases Involving Campaign Con-
tributors, 40 STAN. L. REV. 449, 489 (1988).
75. As Washington Supreme Court Justice Robert Utter commented, "The mere
appearance of a judge's ability to reward his supporters ... and discriminate against
those who did not support him creates a situation which can only reduce public
confidence in the judiciary." Robert F. Utter, Selection and Retention-A Judge's
Perspective, 48 WASH. L. REv. 839, 843 (1973).
76. Several states provide partial funding for judicial elections. Schotland, supra
note 72, at 60. Professor Schotland offers other suggestions for the financing
problem, none of which will solve the problem if a robust contested election is
involved. Schotland, supra note 72, at 123-32.
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Assuming no outside funds from private persons or entities is
sought or needed, the funding of campaigns still raises serious issues.
For example, even if the judge were required to finance her or his
own campaign personally, ethical and sociological problems would
still exist. First, if the campaign costs are high, the candidate's
investment may jeopardize the candidate's financial well-being, thereby
increasing opportunities and motivations to misuse the judicial power
for purposes of personal gain. 7 Less dramatic but not necessarily
less harmful, any resultant financial crisis caused by the campaign
costs may subject the judge to credit problems or require the judge
to have to work through bankruptcy type circumstances. The efforts
to resolve these problems may divert the judge's full-time attention
from the judicial position and thus diminish the judge's effectiveness
as judicial officer. Considering the generally low salary structure for
judges when compared to other legal salaries, this tale of financial
problems for the winning judge is not a fantasy. 78 It may be one
of those situations where the loser wins because the loser may have
better opportunities to resolve any financial crisis caused by the
election campaign. It is doubtful that many qualified persons, other
than wealthy attorneys, would seek or contest judicial positions under
such a limited election funding system, but it would be one of the
few ways an election system could avoid the conflict of interest
perception problems caused by outside fund raising.
77. The Operation Greylord investigation and prosecution of Chicago judges
and others for bribery is a warning that this type of justice may occur. By September
1, 1988, after over ten years of investigation and prosecution, eleven judges were
convicted of various crimes. SPECIAL COMMISSION ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
IN COOK COUNTY, FINAL REPORT 13-14, 55-56 (Sept. 1988). The Special Commission
or. theA _::---lC-ei ok ony salsii flU110LfLLftfUl UL J U3IL .l UUU I.AUILV Ca ItU .l rIugut 104 ~~, wcas
assigned the job of studying all facets of the Cook County courts and issuing a
written report that would recommend improvements in the court system. The final
report discussed the issues raised by Operation Greylord and possible remedies to
the problems uncovered by this investigation. Among its recommendations, the
Commission advocated a merit selection system for judges. Id. at 88; see Lynn
Weisberg, Operation Greylord, 73 JUDICATURE 223 (1990) (reviewing BROCTON
LOCKWOOD & HARLAN M. MENDENHALL, OPERATION GREYLoRD: BROCTON LOCK-
WOOD'S STORY (1989); JAMS TuSHY & ROLO WARDEN, GREYLORD: JUSTICE, CHICAGO
STYLE (1989); SPECIAL COMMSSION ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN COOK
COUNTY, FINAL REPORT (Sept. 1988)).
78. Consider that in Arkansas in 1990 candidates for contested judicial offices
spent, on average, $30,950 apiece. James D. Gingerich & Warren Readnour. The
1990 Arkansas Judicial Elections: Much Ado About Nothing?, ARK. LAW, July
1992, at 37, 40. If the candidate had to fund this entirely from personal resources,
it is clear that full funding by the candidate would be an enormous burden.
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Two informative articles concerning the Arkansas judicial selection
system deserve mention. 79 These pieces provide a wealth of useful
information about the election processes. The statistical information
contained in these articles is worthy of analysis for the purposes of
this discussion. This analysis draws me to some different conclusions
than those indicated by the authors.80 In fact, I believe the data in
these articles substantiate the problems of the current system and
present a strong argument for changing the system to a merit selection
plan.
Some of the financial statistics presented concerning the 1990
judicial elections deserve comment. First, three million dollars was
raised for all judicial campaigns during that election year. In effect,
had these elections been conducted pursuant to a merit selection
plan similar to the one in Wyoming, this would have resulted in a
net savings of three million dollars. These are funds that could have
79. Id. at 37; James D. Gingerich, Campaign Finance in Judicial Elections,
ARK. LAW., Apr. 1989, at 45.
80. The authors analyzed a large number financial statistics concerning judicial
elections between 1976-90. See authorities cited supra note 79. Their conclusions
were that judicial elections are not substantially funded by attorney contributions,
and that the average costs of judicial campaigns in Arkansas have not "skyrocketed."
I am concerned that the authors might have potentially failed to see the forest for
the trees. First, the problems of campaign fund raising do not relate solely to
attorney contributions, but also to the source of all contributions including those
of potential litigants. How many people involved in banking, insurance, or real
estate, for example, contributed to the campaigns? The articles do not suggest the
answer to this question.
Second, the only identified contributors to the campaigns, as a group, were
attorneys who gave $250 or more. Anyone, including many lawyers, who gave less
than that amount fell into a category simply labelled the "unitemized" funding
source category. According to the statistics given, unitemized contributions con-
stituted a significant percentage of the funds raised. Consequently, the real impact
of bar and litigant contributions cannot be ascertained from the public records.
Despite the supposed wall built by the Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 7(B)(2),
between the candidate and contributors, there is no proof or promise that judicial
candidates are unaware of the names of the donors of these funds. It has been
observed that it is unrealistic to believe a judicial candidate does not know who
contributed either time or money to the campaign. See Stuart Banner, Note,
Disqualifying Elected Judges From Cases Involving Campaign Contributors, 40
STAN. L. REV. 449, 470-74 (1988). In addition, if an election is contested knowledge
of who gave to the losing opponent may be as much of an ethical concern.
Third, the average amounts raised and expended do not tell the real costs when
races are aggressively contested. Using 1990 statistics, one supreme court candidate
spent $390,000 and his opponent $240,000, for a total of $630,000. Rare as this
situation may be, if the election system continues it will be repeated at some time
in the future. Other examples of trial court elections costing candidates more than
$100,000 confirm the possibility for high cost campaigns in Arkansas. These type
of expenditures for judicial races are not beneficial to the judicial system, let alone
the particular candidates. The only way to realistically stop them is to abandon
the election appointment system and to adopt a merit selection plan.
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gone to other political candidates or for other preferred purposes.
No retained judge in Wyoming has owed on any loans for his
campaign. The judge's salary goes to the judge, not to the bank
to repay campaign loans. During service as judge over the term
following an election, no Wyoming judge has had to worry about
the ethics of sitting on a case where a contributor or noncontributor
to her or his campaign is counsel. No counsel or client perceives
the judge as proverbially "in the other side's pocket." No campaign
promises or threats were made to retain or obtain office. Rather,
the decisional process is clear and unencumbered. What an
improvement! How refreshingly clean and ethical! What more do
you need from these statistics to overwhelmingly explain why the
merit selection plan is the preferred approach?
As mentioned, major election campaigns not only take a
significant amount of money, but also the incumbent's time." l For
those judges with crowded dockets or caseloads, the time lost may
seriously harm the system or other judges who have to pick up the
slack. Consequently, the incumbent must either neglect the judicial
work (that is, postpone it) or the campaign. To the credit of most
judges, it is the latter that suffers most.
D. Back-room Politics Versus Election Politics
The merit selection system has frequently been criticized for
substituting secret "back-room" politics for the open politics of
public elections. One has to accept that no matter what system of
selection is used some form of "politics" will play a part.
Public election campaigns run from the ridiculously inane, where
no relevant issues are discussed, to the prejudicially sublime, where
positions on legal issues are thoroughly exposed. Clearly, when they
approach the latter extreme, the political shenanigans of public
campaigns are not the form of "politics" that has any redeeming
virtue for the judiciary or the judicial system. When they fall in
the former group, they offer nothing to the system because the
electorate is kept in the dark. Although qualifications can be
emphasized, too often the campaign turns into a public relations
display of qualification irrelevancies. Matters such as incumbency,
judging or trial experience, years of practice, and membership in
organizations are touted without qualitative analysis. Worst yet,
campaign gimmicks, including clever and often professional musical
or visual images, are broadcast to persuade the electorate. Nothing
81. See Robert F. Utter, Selection and Retention-A Judge's Perspective, 48
WASH. L. REv. 839, 845 (1983).
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concerning qualifications is generally necessary or even considered.
Of course, this approach is no different than that used by candidates
for other elected offices and is nothing more than "playing the game
of politics." The problem with this approach for judicial elections
is that "politics as usual" is the evil.82 The judicial system does not
need the political idol: it needs judges who are competent, impartial,
intelligent, etc.8 3 That a contested election system ever produces well-
qualified judges, and amazingly it does, is sometimes purely a matter
of chance. 84
"Politics" in the merit selection system has two radically different
meanings. First, politics can refer to the process of gathering
information about applicants for the judicial position. This is beneficial
political activity because it directly relates to the determination of
merit. We want the merit selection commission to obtain information
concerning the candidate and her or his performance.85 Certainly,
the commission should undertake an ethics check with the state and
national ethics entities to see if the candidate has any significant
violation on record. Expressions of support and opposition from
other attornies, clients, and other citizens should be encouraged.
The more the commission members know about the applicants the
more likely they will make better decisions on who is to be included
on the recommendation list. This is good politics.
Another form of politics relevant to the merit selection process
is the individual commissioners' viewpoints as to what qualifications
are best for members of the judiciary. This was mentioned earlier
and is inherent whenever criteria are undefined.
82. In Fairness, qualitative analysis of these issues in a campaign setting is
probably unrealistic considering the nature of most campaign advertising.
83. For a discussion of the ideal qualifications for a judge, see infra note 122
and accompanying text.
84. In addition, many times the judge is initially appointed by the appointing
authority in the state, and merit may be relevant in that selection process. See
supra note 56.
85. Politics can never be removed entirely from the process. A commentator
reports that one Arizona commissioner believes behind-the-scene campaigning is a
necessary evil because it gives the commission "insight into the breadth of a
candidate's appeal in the community and a candidate's abilities." John M. Roll,
Merit Selection: The Arizona Experience, 22 Axm. ST. L.J. 837, 891 (1990).
One experimental method used in Arizona to make the process more open is
to hold the candidate interviews as public events and to allow them to be televised.
Id. at 890. Judge Roll warns, however, "Whether these procedures result in the
dissemination of worthwhile information or constitute a return to the elusive search
for political charisma remains to be seen." Id. Most states with merit selection do
not hold public interviews. See MARLA N. GREENSTEIN, HANDBOOK FOR JUDICIAL
NOMINATING COMMISSIONERS 16-20 (1984).
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The "bad" type of politics, which receives far greater attention
than it deserves, is the politics of influence. Some have occasionally
raised charges that persons such as governors have exercised their
political power to influence the selection processes. Clearly a governor
who selects members of the commission can have some influence
on the process. 86
Notwithstanding these observations, the role of politics under
the merit selection system pales in significance when compared to
its status under election systems.8 7 The Wyoming experience would
indicate that the problem is more imaginary than real. s8
Responses from commissioners indicate that generally they believe
the list of candidates sent to the governor are the result of the
careful study of information concerning those candidates' abilities.
More importantly, the commissioners generally feel that they have
voted for the person they felt was best for the position. 9 The
overwhelming opinion of commissioners is that the work they do
is extremely significant, is taken seriously, and results in an improved
judiciary2 ° That is as much as any selection system can expect.
86. See Richard A. Watson, Observations on the Missouri Nonpartisan Court
Plan, 40 Sw. L.J. 1, 4 (Special Issue, May 1986). Commonly the nonlawyers are
appointed by the governor. If their terms were staggered, it would probably take
a multiterm governor to affect all lay members. The attorney members of the
commission are usually elected in some manner by members of the bar. The judicial
member of the commission may or may not be influenced by the governor. In
fact, this member may have personal influence. Consequently, governors would
seldom control a majority of the commission. Id. at 4-5.
87. Roll, supra note 85, at 865.
88. Golden, supra note 53. Chief Justice Golden expressed the belief that the
processes would be improved and secured from misuse if the commissioners could
receive greater training on their responsibilities and how they should handle the
pressures from outside persons. Golden, supra note 53. The American Judicature
Society offers a wide range of materials and assistance on such training. See, e.g.,
GREENSTEIN, supra note 85.
89. MissouRI BAR ASS'N SPECIAL COMM. TO REVIEW AND EVALUATE THE MISSOURI
NONPARTISAN COURT PLAN, REPORT TO THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE MISSOURI
BAR 9 (Jan. 15, 1986).
90. Beth M. Henschen et al., Judicial Nominating Commissioners: A National
Profile, 73 JUDICATURE 328 (1990). The authors concluded:
Of course, many of the criticisms that the commissioners leveled at merit
selection, as well as their suggestions for improving the process, are not
new; rather, they are reflective of concerns that have been expressed since
the adoption of the Missouri Plan 50 years ago. It is also important to
note, however, that only one-third of our respondents had negative com-
ments to make or offered proposals for change. Of those suggestions that
were made, the overwhelming majority fell into the "technical, fine-tuning"
category. Over one-half of the commissioners had no complaints with how
the process works in their states, while the remaining 15 per cent praised
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E. Campaigning on Issues
The contentious nature of elections can undermine the public
policy goal that judges act impartially and without political influence.
The ethical rules for judges prohibit judicial candidates, to one
degree or another, from making campaign promises. 9' On the one
hand, we are faced with the dilemma of an innocuous, monotonous
campaign for judicial office under Model Code of Judicial Conduct
Canon 5(A)(3)(d). 92 On the other hand, pledges can threaten
perceptions of judicial impartiality and thereby reduce public
their commission's performance. One non-lawyer wrote that she serves on
as "effective and efficient commission. The members take their respon-
sibility very seriously and deliberations are both thoughtful and thorough."
Another layperson called merit selection a "near-perfect system" and found
being a commissioner a "very satisfying and fulfilling experience." Attorney
members also expressed satisfaction with the operation of their commissions
and many viewed it as an important component of professional respon-
sibility. "It's the greatest single thing an attorney can do to contribute
to the quality of the legal system," one respondent wrote. The significance
of participating in the selection of state judges was summarized by a fellow
attorney: "I can think of few more delicate and far-reaching tasks in the
profession of law."
Id. at 334.
91. For example, Canon 5(A)(3)(d) of the Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct
states:
(3) A candidate for a judicial office:
(d) shall not:
(i) make pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful
and impartial performance of the duties of the office;
(ii) announce views on disputed legal or political issues; or
(iii) knowingly misrepresent the identity, qualifications, present position
or other fact concerning the candidate or an opponent ....
ARK. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d) (1993). The commentary to
Canon 5(A)(3)(d) stated:
Section 5A(3)(d) prohibits a candidate for judicial office from making
statements that appear to commit the candidate regarding cases, contro-
versies or issues likely to come before the court. As a corollary, a candidate
should emphasize in any public statement the candidate's duty to uphold
the law regardless of his or her personal views. See also Section 3B(9),
the general rule on public comment by judges. Section 5A(3)(d) does not
prohibit a candidate from making pledges or promises respecting improve-
ments in court administration. Nor does this Section prohibit an incumbent
judge from making private statements to other judges or court personnel
in the performance of judicial duties. This Section applies to any statement
made in the process of securing judicial office, such as statements to
commissions charged with judicial selection and tenure and legislative bodies
confirming appointment. See also Rule 8.2 of the Arkansas Rules of
Professional Conduct.
Id. (commentary).
92. See supra note 91.
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confidence in the judicial system.93 The prejudicial result of issue
oriented campaigns and the possibility of necessary recusal demands
by litigants due to preordained opinions expressed during the campaign
cannot be overstated. One cannot obey Canon 5(A)(3)(d) and still
participate in a lively issue-oriented, contested campaign. 94 Either
the judicial candidate will advocate selected causes that he or she
will pursue, or no issues of merit will be raised, leaving the electorate
in an intellectual vacuum. 95 Thus, the election process risks
infringement on the judicial ethical standards that bar judges from
taking public positions on legal matters.
Recently District Judge George Howard of the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas held Canon
5(A)(3)(d) unconstitutional. 6 Complaints about two judges' behavior
in separate campaigns were filed with the Arkansas Judicial Discipline
and Disability Commission (AJDDC). The AJDDC is responsible
for the enforcement of the Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct. The
alleged violations concerned two candidates for different circuit court
positions who had campaigned. on the premise that they would not
allow or would restrict plea bargaining in their courts if elected.
93. Professor Snyder summarized the problem as follows:
Justification for the Judicial Code's restrictions on campaign rhetoric
by candidates in judicial elections rests on two grounds. First, campaign
pledges and policy pronouncements arguably interfere with the judge's
impartiality. The judge allegedly is less able to render a fair and unbiased
decision on an issue that comes before him if he has committed himself
to a course of conduct or policy on that issue as a candidate for office.
Second, the restrictions allegedly preserve public confidence in the ju-
diciary. If judicial candidates were free to make campaign pledges or
discuss disputed issues, the argument goes, the public would view the
candidates as politicians with personal agendas rather than impartial arbiters
who follow the dictates of the law. Consequently, citizens would lose faith
in the ability of judges to decide dispassionately and fairly the issues that
come before them.
Lloyd B. Snyder, The Constitutionality and Consequences of Restrictions on Cam-
paign Speech by Candidates for Judicial Office, 35 UCLA L. REv. 207, 214 (1987).
94. Rules limiting judicial campaign speech distort that debate. By limiting the
capacity of campaigners for judicial office to provide voters with useful, relevant
information about their reasons for seeking office, campaign restrictions inhibit
election campaigning and give added credence to the argument that judges should
be appointed.
95. Kurt E. Scheuerman, Comment, Rethinking Judicial Elections, 72 OR. L.
REV. 459, 479 (1993). The author stated, "If judges are left to discuss only their
identity, qualifications, and present position, the voters will have little information
upon which to make a choice." Id.
96. Beshear v. Butt, 863 F. Supp. 913 (E.D. Ark. 19940. Apparently the AJDDC
will not appeal this decision.
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Judge Howard's full statement concerning First Amendment rights
versus the judicial ethics rule is worthy of quotation:
This Court is persuaded that 7(B)(1)(c) and 5(A)(3)(d), which
contain virtually the same language, in precluding a judicial
candidate from expressing "his views on disputed legal or political
issues" are substantially overbroad and vague. These provisions
prevent a significant amount of constitutionally protected conduct
by inhibiting free expressions as well as imposing a chilling effect
on a judicial candidate's efforts and desire to express his views
to the public relative to problems confronting the judiciary and
how the candidate proposes to deal with them. Indeed, 7(B)(1)(c)
and 5(A)(3)(d) minimize the importance of free speech and openness
in the very branch of the government that serves as guardian of
the civil liberties of the people. These provisions impose a direct
and substantial limitation on expressions that are secured under
the First Amendment. In other words, these canons are too
inclusive. On the other hand, they are vague. Defendants themselves
refer to caselaw, which will occur on a case to case basis, as a
way to define the involved language. Truly, a judicial candidate
striving diligently to conduct a campaign that is consistent with
the canons, without the benefit of any specific standards as a
guide, would in all likelihood refrain from expressing his views,
while permissible under the First Amendment, in order to avoid
the risk of a probable cause hearing likely to result in a public
reprimand as happened to Donovan .97
This decision has significant ramifications for judicial elections
in the future. 9 Judicial candidates are not going to be ethically
97. Id. at 917-18. The court cited Buckley v. Illinois Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997
F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1993). In that case, Judge Posner wrote the opinion that
invalidated the rule as unconstitutional and rejected the lower court's attempt to
rewrite or narrow the same provision. Id. at 230-31.
98. Not all courts see the constitutional issue the same way. The Kentucky
Supreme Court held its similar rule to be constitutional and distinguished the
Buckley case. Deters v. Judicial Retirement & Removal Comm'n, 873 S.W.2d 200
(Ky. 1994). There seems to be some debate over the particular words of the ethics
rule. The Arkansas Rule states that a judicial candidate shall not "announce views
on disputed legal or political issues." ARK. CODE OF JUDICIAL. CONDUCT Canon
5(A)(3)(d)(ii) (1993). Before invalidated in Buckley, the Illinois rule was the same.
Buckley, 997 F.2d at 225. The Kentucky Rule, however, is slightly different and
states that a judicial candidate shall not "make statements that commit or appear
to commit the candidate with respect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely
to come before the court. . . ." Ky. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B)(l)(c)
(1977). Do the words "likely to come before the court" make a difference? Is
there a difference between prejudging a case or controversy before the court and
making public statements concerning one's political philosophy concerning judicial
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restricted from speaking out on relevant legal and political issues.
The ethical lid is off, and some candidates will find it irresistible
to express their free speech on a wide range of judicial issues. This
will be particularly applicable in contested elections where campaign
advantage is a requirement. Judicial candidates may find it
advantageous to express opinions concerning judicial issues that seem
to be popular with the electorate. A topic that will probably receive
greater attention in contested judicial campaigns, considering the
current mood of the general electorate, is how the candidate as
judge will deal with "criminals."
This ruling is fuel for the fire of change in our current judicial
selection system. If one feels outspoken judicial candidates are
intolerable, a rape of the judicial system, and something that must
be prevented, that person should support a change from the election
selection system for judges to a merit selection system. 99 Although
retention elections can raise these types of issues,100 there will be
far fewer occasions when this will occur, and if it does, the bar
and others interested in judicial independence can take a united
stand against the debate. When, however, elections are contested,
there is generally no way for the bar to take a stance because of
personal divisions concerning candidate support. In addition, issue
controversies are more likely to be found in contested elections than
in retention elections because contested elections involve candidates
who have organizations that seek funds for the campaigns.
F. Accountability and Retention
A foundational concept of our judicial system is that our judges
must be independent in their judgment, that they should not make
review or issues of public interest? These questions and others will have to be
resolved before the full impact of these decisions on judicial elections can be
determined. Notwithstanding the validity of variations of the rule, the current
Arkansas Rule is inapplicable as far as campaigns for judgeships are concerned.
99. See Snyder, supra note 93, at 263.
100. There are several notorious exceptions to this observation. The California
election of 1986, where three supreme court justices were defeated in retention
elections, is the most serious example of the opposite occurrence. See Robert S.
Thompson, Judicial Retention Elections and Judicial Method: A Retrospective on
the California Retention Election of 1986, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 2007 (1988). The
1992 election in Wyoming when two judges were not retained is another example.
See supra note 54. The point is that so long as elections are a part of the total
selection system for judges, the elections may be contentious, but this contentiousness
is going to occur less often in retention elections than in contested elections.
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decisions on the basis of political influence or popularity.' 0'
Consequently, removal techniques should protect the judges'
independence from public sway in the individual case, but allow for
removal due to unfitness, misconduct, and even unpopular opinions. 0 2
An impeachment standard of high crimes and misdemeanors is
generally too high a standard for state judges. If a state retains a
retention process either through contestable elections or through
retention elections, it must be assumed that the judges do not
necessarily have lifetime positions and are accountable to the electorate
for their conduct and even sometimes for their opinions. Results
may occur under either approach that some may feel infringe on
the judges' judicial independence.
Judicial independence, however, is only one of the attributes
of a well functioning judicial system. A system that is counter-
majoritarian should not be totally separate from the will of the
people. Having a method by which the public may participate is
another equally important attribute, especially to engender public
confidence in the system. Drawing the political line between judicial
independence and public accountability is the difficult task for a
judicial selection system.
It has been argued persuasively that accountability is an equal
consideration with independence, especially when judges deal with
policy and discretionary legal issues. One commentator summarized
this position as follows:
101. The reasons offered for the need for judicial independence can be summarized
as follows:
A. The judiciary serves a critical antimajoritarian role requiring protection
from temporary public majorities and shifting popular opinion.
B. As a separate branch of the government with its poer of judicial
review of the acts of the other branches of the government, including
legislatures or executives, the judiciary must be protected from the influence
or control of those branches of the government.
C. The public credibility of the judiciary depends on the perception of
impartiality, and thus judges must be free from the private influence of
others.
See DuBois, supra note 20, at 20-28.
102. As stated in a recent article on judicial selection, "Judges should be free
to decide cases based upon the Constitution, the applicable laws, reason, and
precedent, not popular will." Lawrence R Yetka & Christopher H. Yetka, Selection
and Retention of Judges in Minnesota, 15 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 169, 170
(1994); see also Chisom v. Roemer, 111 S. Ct. 2354, 2366 (1991). In Chisom, the
Court noted, "The fundamental tension between the ideal character of the judicial
office and the real world of electoral politics cannot be resolved by crediting judges
with total indifference to the popular will while simultaneously requiring them to
run for elected offics." Chisom, 111 S. Ct. at 2366-67 (emphasis added) (citation
and footnotes omitted).
19941
UALR LAW JOURNAL
Constitutional decision-making involving alleged deprivations of
important fundamental rights and liberties is only a small portion
of what state courts are asked to do. State judiciaries are far
more occupied "with common law development, statutory
application and interpretation, procedural review, and the
supervision of lower courts." It is this difference in judicial
function which suggests a different balance to be struck between
accountability and independence. . . . In most of their work,
courts should be supportive of majoritarian values and concerns. 03
The recent story of the three California Supreme Court judges
who were not retained under that state's retention election system
is a tale of success for the system. 104 The public spoke and the
judiciary had to listen. Independence without responsibility for actions
and philosophy is totally counter to any democratic principle. This
election did not overturn any cases. It sent a message that judges
cannot be philosophically arrogant with no concern for the beliefs
of the public at large. Some have said this raped the judicial system,
but I believe it was refreshing that the public could become interested
and involved in the judicial selection process. The same result will
most likely not occur again soon. Judicial accountability is desired
by the public and is a reasonable burden on the judiciary as a
whole. All retention systems carry with them this judicial interference
potential.
Commentators at both ends of the debate sometimes criticize
the merit selection system. I have heard judges complain about the
retention election aspect of the system because they believe that
judges are put at risk and the electorate may throw them out for
improper reasons or even no cause at all. When the retention system
produces a negative do-not-retain vote the cry is "foul." Many
consider it unfair and an attack on the independence of the judiciary.
On the other hand, I have heard other opponents argue that the
retention system basically guarantees reelection as no one ever loses.
When the system retains a large percentage of the judges who seek
retention, it is called ineffective, nonresponsive, and predetermined.
I think both opinions, being on the extreme, are correct in regard
to result but wrong in regard to the merit of these results. These
opposing results clearly reveal the balance which the merit system
is trying to produce: job security and judicial independence under
103. Dubois, supra note 1, at 39 (footnotes omitted).
104. See Thompson, supra note 100.
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normal circumstances, but accountability and rejection when the
electorate believe it deserved. This is not a fault of the system-
but a strength. It removes the greatest evil of election systems
contested, costly campaigns-but retains a degree of electorate input
and involvement which, I believe, with the right bar and media
encouragement, can be converted into public confidence in the judicial
system.
Whenever the election system is used, it requires public
participation to work properly. The extremes of participation are
the problem. Apathy and high priced, vindictive media campaigns
are undesirable. The goal must lie somewhere in the middle. The
electorate should vote with knowledge of the relevant issues, including
the candidate's or incumbent's competence, past conduct, personal
character, and judicial philosophy.
One of the paradoxical problems with every judicial election
system is that the more interest the public shows in a judicial election,
the more ethical and institutional harm that may be done. Hotly
contested judicial elections that draw public interest often either
concern candidates who as part of campaign strategy express their
positions on legal issues, a clear conflict between the candidates'
First Amendment rights and the judicial code of ethics, 05 or concern
a new candidate who attacks an incumbent on the results, and not
the legal merits, of the incumbent's previous judicial decisions.
Neither situation really benefits the judicial system. If election
accountability is a part of the selection or retention system, one or
more of these situations will occur at some time or other. Although
attacking an incumbent's decisions may occur in retention elections
under a merit selection plan, the primary system for these consequences
remains the full contested election system. It is the advocacy for
the position that makes these elections so threatening to the judicial
system and to judicial independence.
Clearly, the sitting judge has the advantage in a retention election
process. If there is no controversy, the electorate will vote "yes."
Moreover, those who are concerned about the quality of the judiciary
must undertake efforts to inform the electorate as to the decision
to be made. Much of this falls on the shoulders of the bar, and
the bar should and normally will assume responsibility.' °6
105. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
106. Judges in Arkansas were for several years evaluated by lawyers answering
a questionnaire prepared by the Arkansas Bar Association. This practice ended
several years ago, apparently because of the complaints of judges. Interview with
William A. Martin, Executive Director, Arkansas State Bar Association (Dec. 1,
1994).
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G. Judicial Evaluation and Discipline
Judge evaluation systems have been instituted in many states.
Generally, they involve some type of a poll which is sent to members
of the bar and others who have direct contact with the members
of the judiciary. The questionnaires usually request those polled to
rate each judge on a sliding scale of five or more evaluative levels,
ranging from best to unsatisfactory. The subjects concern many of
the factors that relate to the attributes of a good judge, including
character, integrity, impartiality, courtesy, prejudice, diligence,
intelligence, temperament, legal knowledge, punctuality, promptness,
decisiveness, and fortitude. The questionnaires emphasize that only
those who had contact with a specific judge should provide responses
for that judge.
The results of these polls are tabulated and disseminated via
the appropriate media. If done properly, these results can be helpful
to the electorate either in contested elections or in retention elections.
Unfortunately, under the contested election system of selecting judges,
performance evaluations only have a consequence if the elections
are contested. In addition, the opponent is usually not evaluated,
and thus any evaluation is potentially unfair to the incumbent. Under
a merit selection system, performance evaluation efforts are always
relevant and can be effective.1°
Greater efforts in this regard need to be taken. The surveys
need to be fine tuned to ensure that they are both fair to the judge
and are obtaining the most relevant responses from the persons
polled. Finally, additional study and effort must be undertaken to
improve the methods of the dissemination of the collective evaluations
to the electorate so that the process will have the intended results. 08
107. Another anecdotal story is worthy of mention There was a district judge
in Wyoming who was known for his less than gentle treatment of lawyers, clients,
and jurors in his courtroom. It was the general consensus that he was outrageous
and should be censured for some conduct with which he had been charged. He
had become judge under the election system and had never faced an opponent in
great part due to the fear he had put into members of the bar. Although grand-
fathered in under the merit selection plan, he, like all other judges in the system,
had to run in a retention election in the last year of his term. With certain examples
of outrageous conduct freshly in mind, the bar and several citizen groups publicized
the word to the electorate that this person should not be a judge. The election
proved that the campaign was successful, and the judge was not retained. Some
fear that this type of campaign may occur where a judge makes an unpopular
decision.
108. No dissemination system works correctly in every situation. The dynamics
of the electortate and its collective reaction to individual circumstances are sometimes
disconcerting to lawyers who sincerely desire and strive to improve the judiciary
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The direct cooperation and guidance of the media needs to be
obtained.
Using judicial discipline processes is another course of action.
Forty-eight of the fifty states now have established some form of
judicial discipline system.' °9 In Arkansas, the Arkansas Judicial
Discipline and Disability Commission was established in 1989.
Unfortunately, it is not designed or intended to deal with the typical
complaints concerning judges." 0 The purpose of the Commission is
to deal with major acts of judicial misconduct, incompetence, and
wrongdoing. The potential actions by the Commission include
reprimand or censure, suspension with or without pay, or removal.",
The grounds set out in the Arkansas Constitution justifying sanctions
include violations of the professional and ethical standards governing
judicial officers, conviction of a felony, or physical or mental disability
that prevents the proper performance of judicial duties." 2 Statutory
grounds for suspension and removal include any conviction of a
felony or other crime that reflects adversely on the judge's honesty,
trustworthiness, or fitness as a judge in other respects; conduct that
involves dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, or which is
prejudicial to the administration of justice; any willful judicial or
professional ethics violation; willful and persistent failure to perform
the duties of office; or habitual intemperance in the use of alcohol
or other drugs."'
and the judicial system. One tale of woe illustrating this matter occurred in Alaska,
a state which not only has a merit selection system but also an elaborate judge
evaluation system. In a retention election of four judges where one was declared
under the evaluation system to be unqualified, the electorate approved the "un-
qualified" judge by a greater margin than the ones who received positive evaluation.
Here the bar had taken an active stance against a judge and was rebuked by the
electorate. A complete analysis of this situation is discussed in William Jenkins,
Jr., Retention Elections: Who Wins When No One Loses?, 61 JUDICATURE 79, 82-
83 (1977).
109. THE BOOK OF STATES, supra note 6, at 193-99. New Hampshire and Vermont
appear to be the two exceptions. THE BOOK OF STATES, supra note 6, at 193-99.
110. The constitutional grounds are as follows:
Grounds for sanctions imposed by the Commission or recommendations
made by the Commission shall be violations of the professional and ethical
standards governing judicial officers, conviction of a felony, or physical
or mental disability that prevents the proper performance of judicial duties.
Grounds for suspension, leave, or removal from office shall be determined
by legislative enactment.
ARK. CONST. amend. LXVI. For the statutory definitions, see infra note 113.
111. ARK. CONST. amend. LXVI.
112. ARK. CONST. amend. LXVI.
113. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-10-410(b) (Michie Supp 1994). The statute states:
(b) a Judge may be removed from office on any of the following grounds:
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As indicated, the difficulty with these procedures is that they
anticipate grievous conduct that goes to the heart of whether the
person is qualified to continue to serve as judge. Many difficulties
that judges encounter involve matters that do not reach the scope
of being ethical or legal violations, neglect, or failure of duty. These
problems deal directly with a judge's working relationships with
attorneys who practice before the judge or with persons who have
judicial contact with the judge, including jurors, parties, and witnesses.
These matters may be petty on a scale of seriousness, but are very
important to the persons affected. These types of issues such as the
setting of court dates, the timeliness of decisions, and the treatment
of attorneys, litigants, witnesses, and jurors can give a judge a bad
reputation and can affect the result of elections including retention
elections. It is unfortunate that no process can effectively deal with
such complaints." 4 Judges resist these procedures for a variety of
reasons, including a fear that they may have to defend themselves
continually against petty complaints. The lack of such a system,
however, creates tensions that can mature into rejection at the ballot
box." 5
H. Diversity Considerations
The selection consideration of diversity is a difficult issue to
satisfactorily resolve. First, as previously mentioned, the merit selection
system is generally more flexible in regard to the types of persons
who seek positions.16 Thus, diversity is satisfied to this extent. If
diversity means greater opportunity for women and minority lawyers,
(1) Conviction of any offense punishable as a felony under the laws of
Arkansas or the United States;
(2) Conviction of a criminal act that reflects adversely on the judge's
honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a judge in other respects;
(3) The commission of conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation;
(4) The commission of conduct that is prejudicial to the administration
of justice;
(5) Willful violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct or Professional
Responsibility;
(6) Willful and persistent failure to perform the duties of office;
(7) Habitual intemperance in the use of alcohol or other drugs.
Id.
114. See Kenyon N Griffin & Michael J. Horan, Judicial Merit Retention in
Wyoming: An Analysis and Some Suggestions for Reform, 15 LAND & WATER L.
REV. 567, 588-91 (1980).
115. See Michael J. Horan & Kenyon N. Griffin, Ousting the Judge: Campaign
Politics in- the 1984 Wyoming Judicial Retention Elections, 24 LAND & WATER L.
REV. 371, 398 (1989).
116. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
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the past records of all selection systems have been less that
exemplary.'1 7 Age may be a factor in this matter. Most judges are
elected or selected when they are in their late 40s and 50s.1"s Because
the number of female and minority attorneys has increased rapidly
in the last fifteen years, many potential candidates from these groups
are just now reaching this age and experience level. Considering also
that a properly functioning merit selection system should select
women and minorities in greater numbers than will general election
systems,"19 one inevitably concludes that the diversity of the judiciary
is better placed under the control of a merit selection commission
than under an election process. Speculative as it may be, I believe
that Arkansas would have more quickly had a full-term minority
member of the supreme court or the court of appeals under the
merit selection process. Most of the women judges we currently have
were originally appointed, and we would have had more if a merit
selection system had been in place over the last ten years.
V. SELECTION CRITERIA
The debate over which system is better than another system
revolves around the issue of who is best qualified to be a judge.
In addition to selection methods that affect judicial criteria, observers
disagree on what experience and training are best for members of
the judiciary. Many lawyers think that only attorneys who have
significant trial experience should be judges. Others feel that the
judiciary should represent a broader spectrum of skills and expe-
riences, including nonlitigation practitioners, academics, and gov-
ernment or corporate attorneys.
The intensity of this debate may depend in large part on the
type of judge whose selection is to be made. A trial judge may
require trial practice experience in order to make trial decisions
concerning evidence and other trial process issues. On the other
hand, appellate judges make few of these types of decisions and
may better possess reflective, intellectually oriented experiences and
skills. Unfortunately, desirable skills are seldom discussed and almost
never qualitatively evaluated.
117. Anthony Champagne, The Selection and Retention of Judges in Texas, 40
Sw. L.J. 53, 105-06 (Special Issue, May 1986).
118. See, e.g., James D. Gingerich & Warren Readnour, The 1990 Arkansas
Judicial Elections: Much Ado About Nothing?, ARK. LAW., July 1992, at 37, 38;
James D. Gingerich, Campaign Finance in Judicial Elections, ARK. LAW., Apr.
1989, at 66, 69.
119. Norman Krivosha, Acquitting Judges by the Merit Selection Method: The
Case for Adoptitg Such a Method, 40 Sw. L.J. 15, 19 (Special Issue, May 1986).
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My personal position on this is one of total flexibility. The
legal profession is a large, diverse profession with room enough to
accommodate a wide range of experiences and backgrounds. It is
my feeling that the judiciary should have representatives from all
aspects of legal experience, including trial lawyers, litigation lawyers,
corporate lawyers, corporate attorneys, and academics. These are
all part of the same profession. They exhibit the same training.
Although their experiences may be different, their intellectual and
judicial foundation and spirit come from the same sources. All of
them are in the business of representing persons or causes, developing
logical and substantively sustainable positions, and nurturing an
underlying sense of fairness and justice which the system requires.
Comparing the selection systems from the standpoint of desirable
skills and experiences is revealing. When judicial selection is to be
made by a commission, the professional resume of service and
performance assumes greater importance. If judicial selection is by
ballot in a contested election, the candidate's political skills and
connections are paramount.
Who makes the best judge? From the litigant's personal stand-
point, the answer is simple-the one who rules in my favor! Although
not an acceptable answer, this philosophy is relevant to what selection
technique is used to choose our judges. Everyone wants a judge
who one believes will treat her or him fairly and sympathetically in
result and be simpatico of mind. Unfortunately, this is not really
the proper test. Some have expressed the thought that defining the
perfect judge is impossible and that any list of virtues is elusive
and obscure. 20
Despite these admonitions, let me suggest a guide to necessary
qualities. Society needs judges who are intelligent, honest, diligent,
120. Maurice Rosenberg, The Qualities of Justice-Are They Strainable?, 44 TEX.
L. REv. 1063 (1966). Professor Rosenberg so eloquently posed the problem:
An inqury such as this probes so deeply into imponderables that it may
be rash to enter upon it even with the greatest difidence. Obviously, the
custodians of every sector of human activity are eager to compile a list
of qualities that "best equip" a man to perform the chosen work with
excellence, but everywhere the composition of the list is notoriously elusive.
It is particularly obscure when the qualities sought are personal, subjective,
and human-those that are important in measuring a lawyer for a judgeship.
Yet as hard as the task may be, there is a special urgency for finding
the human qualitis in a judge that are most promising and the flaws that
are most damaging. More than the teacher, the engineer, or the lawyer,
the judge acts directly upon the property, liberty, even life, of his fellows.
Id. at 1064.
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self-disciplined, decisive, reflective, courteous, organized, courageous,
and learned in the law. 21 Judges should also possess an inherent
sense of good ethical behavior, high personal integrity, justice, com-
passion for people, personal humility, and fidelity to their oaths of
office and legal institutions. 22 There are undesirable qualities, too.
Society cannot tolerate judges who are mean spirited, dishonest, or
mentally incompetent. Because no one will perfectly satisfy the ideal,
we must strive for reasonable acceptability. In addition, we must
not give too much definiteness to each characteristic because judges
should be a diverse group, representative of a wide range of ex-
periences, 21 personalities, and heritages. A dedicated consciousness
in the selection process of the goal of increasing representation of
the number of judges of different races and sexes is essential. 24
One relevant observation concerning the suggested characteristics
for judges is that they do not include any of the characteristics
often found in successful political candidates-charisma, party af-
filiation, campaign organization, fund raising ability, and public
notoriety. If the elected judge possesses any of the desired char-
acteristics, and most of our elected judges do possess them, it is
not necessarily attributable to the election process, but to the general
quality of the candidate pool of lawyers. Most would concede that
a few of our elected judges do not qualify under the above rec-
ommended personal qualities.
VI. ARKANSAS PROPOSALS FOR JUDICIAL SELECTION REFORM
A. Nonpartisan Elections
An Arkansas Bar proposal for the 1995 legislative session was
to adopt a nonpartisan election system for all judicial elections. This
proposal represented a political compromise. It was based on the
121. For an interesting and insightful piece in which four authorities on the
judiciary discuss what they each believe are desirable traits in appellate judges, see
Ruggero J. Aldisert et al., What Makes a Good Appellate Judge? Four Views, 22
JUDGES' J., Spring 1983, at 14 (Pieces by Judges Ruggero J. Aldisert, William H.
Erickson, and Samuel J. Roberts, and Professor Robert A. Leflar). See Rosenberg,
supra note 120; Sheldon Goldman, Judicial Selection and the Qualities that Make
a "Good" Judge, ANNALS, July 1982, at 112.
122. This list of ideal desirable characteristics might be considerd a direct roadmap
to sainthood. Jokingly, it might not hurt if the person could walk on water or
be in two or more places at th same time Actually, judes must avoid a divinity
complex. See Aldisert et al., supra note 121.
123. Including cultural, professional, and educational differences.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 116-119, for a discussion of this diversity
issue.
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proverbial thought that half-a-loaf is better than no loaf at all. At
this point, it may still be the only reform legislatively feasible.
Unfortunately, it might be worse than no reform if better reform
could come at a later time. 25
From an analytical standpoint of desirable features for a judicial
selection system, a nonpartisan election system may be the worst of
all selection methods. 26 First, it does nothing to remove the corruptive
aspects of a contested election system. Judges must still obtain
campaign funds, must still spend inordinate time campaigning, and
campaigns can still create judicial ethics problems over campaign
issues. In addition, it has been said that nonpartisan elections are
often so in name only, that parties still support certain candidates
over others on a formal endorsement or informal endorsement basis. 27
True nonpartisan elections may exacerbate the campaign financing
problems of the candidates because contributions may be more
difficult to obtain and campaign costs higher because of the greater
difficulty candidates will have in getting their messages across. 2
Some contend that the electorate is actually more uninformed about
candidates in nonpartisan judicial elections than those in partisan
elections. 29 At least in partisan elections the electorate has some
reference points, such as party identification and its normal
philosophical meanings. 30 In addition, nonpartisan elections draw
lower voter interest and participation,' and voter decisions are made
on the basis of incumbency or ballot labels, such as judge or district
attorney.
These results are hardly an endorsement of the nonpartisan
election system. It seems to me that Arkansas would be better off
125. David W. Case, In Search of an Independent Judiciary: Alternatives to
fu(lic-10 e ~ions I'stf-ippi, .3 Mis.C. L. REv. , -... D, sup
note 20, at 7-8.
126. It is conceded that many states use this system for one or more of their
courts. See THE BOOK OF STATES, supra note 6, at 190-92.
127. Anthony Champagne, The Selection an Retention of Judges in Texas, 40
Sw. L.J. 53, 63 (Special Issue, May 1986); see also Davi Adamany & Philip Dubois,
Electing State Judges, 1976 Wis. L. REV. 731, 756-60.
128. Champagne, supra note 127, at 63.
129. Dubois, supra note 1, at 44-45.
130. Dubois, supra note 1, at 44-45.
131. Kurt E. Scheuerman, Comment, Rethinking Judicial Elections, 72 OR. L.
REV. 459, 477 (1993). The author determined: "Thus, nearly one-third of voters
in nonpartisan elections do not cast votes in the judicial races." Id.; see Dunois,
supra note 20, at 48.
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retaining its current system than to go to nonpartisan elections. It
is not the type of reform that is needed, and I fear that if adopted,
the legislature will think it has properly reformed the system.
B. New Judicial Article
The better course of action is to continue to promote the new
Judicial Article proposed in 1990.132 This new Judicial Article proposal
would establish a merit selection system similar to the Wyoming
system discussed previously.' It proposes the creation of a Judicial
Nominating Commission composed of nine members' 31-four
lawyers,' 35 four lay persons, 3 6 and a judge.'37 This commission would
be charged with the task of recommending, within thirty days'38
132. Draft: Proposed Judicial Article, NEWS BULL., Sept.-Oct. 1990, at 2. Relevant
portions of this draft are reproduced in Appendix B.
133. Id. § 17-18, at 3.
134. Except, of course, for the ex officio judge, members would only be permitted
to serve two terms. Id. § 17(F). The fourt year terms are staggered. Id.
135. One lawyer from each congressional district would be elected by a majority
vote of the licensed attorneys actually voting and residing in the district. Id. §
17(C).
136. One lay member from each congressional district would be selected by a
majority vote of the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, and Attorney General. Id.
§ 17(C).
137. Members of the Supreme Court would select from among themselves the
judge who would act as hair of the commission. Id.
138. Id. § 17(A). Most of the states that have merit selection systems have
adopted a thirty day rule and apparently are able to properly function. See MARLA
N. GREENSTEIN, HANDBOOK FOR JUDICIAL NOMINATING COMMISSIONERS 16-20 (1984).
This short time period of commission action makes the replacement procedure
extremely swift and efficient. From a practical standpoint, however, it may not
provide enough time to adequately complete all the tasks that must be completed,
including the dissemination of information concerning the vacancy, gathering and
reviewing applications, conducting necessary background investigations on applicants,
and interviewing the candidates. The short time period has two real problems.
First, it forecloses full recruitment activities which are useful in achieving diversity
on the courts, and second, it forecloses adequate review and investigation of
applicants' professional and personal backgrounds. It would not be unrealistic to
speculate that thirty or more attorneys might file for a supreme court posistion.
How can a commission adequately review these applications? Thirty days sets an
impossible timetable and should be changed to sixty days. See Wyo. CoNsT. art.
V, § 4(b).
Another rationale for the short time table woud be to effective limit the op-
portunities available to political activists who could put undue presure on com-
missioners. One the other hand, the short period might benefit persons who have
inside notice of an impending resignation or retirement by a current judge. Not-
withstanding these counterpoints, I worry that the commission will not have the
time to obtain the information necessary to fully grasp the applicants' qualifications
or disqualifications and thus will not be able to cognitivey and thoroughly reflect
on the comparative merits of the applicants.
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from the date of the vacancy, three qualified candidates for final
selection by the Governor.3 9 If the Governor failed to select from
the list within thirty days from the date of submission of the list,
the chief justice would make the selection.' 4° If the vacancy was in
the position of chief justice, upon the failure of the Governor to
act, the Lieutenant Governor would select the new judge.1 41 This
merit selection technique would be applicable to all appellate judges.' 42
It would retain nonpartisan elections for trial judges. 4 1 Midterm
vacancies for trial judges, however, would be selected via the merit
selection method, with selected judges being able to succeed
themselves.'" This approach would go a long way to provide the
type of reform necessary to get the Arkansas judiciary out of the
corruptive influences of the election system.
Unfortunately, even this proposal is too controversial. The
proposal was passed by the senate in revised form, 145 but did not
succeed in the house. Opponents abound and range from several
judges and ex-judges who sincerely believe in the election system,
to some legislators' and some members of the media who believe
139. Draft: Proposed Judicial Article, NEWS BULL., Sept-Oct. 1990, § 17(A), at
3.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Including the supreme court and the court of appeals. Id. § 17.
143. Trial judges include judges of a revised circuit court and a new district
court. Id. § 18. Frankly, this is not beneficial. Campaign costs, candidates' future
promises of judicial results, and attacks on the incumbent's decision occur more
frequently at the trial level than they do at the appellate level. Trial level judges
should be selected by the merit system as well.
144. The net effect of this convoluted approach to merit selection is that the
merit selection system would initially select a large number of trial judges. Because
the proposal would eliminate the limitation on the ability of appointed judges to
succeed themselves, these judges would run as incumbents and their chances of
reelection would be great. Consequently, the merit selection system would effectively
control who would initially become trial judges in many situations. But the merit
selected appointed judge would possibly face direct opposition in the next election
for the position.
145. Obviously, the change from an election system to a merit system was too
controversial to include in the proposed constitutional amendment itself. The senate
version of the amendment would have retained the election system, but also would
have allowed the legislature to submit a merit selection system to the electorate at
a later time.
146. Although seldom expressed, there is an undercurrent of interbranch jealousy
between the legislature and the judiciary. A few legislators privately express the
opinion that judges ar arrogant, unruly, and unresponsive bullies who need to be
cut down a notch or two. Requiring judicial elections is a subtle way to make
this cut. Therefore, an "if I have to run, so should you" attitude prevails. Add
to this the interbranch jealousy of the executive branch. A legislator may not want
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the merit selection system is a conspiracy of the legal profession
against the public.
One of the most preplexing factors in the Arkansas situation
is the opposition to the merit system by the Democratic Party. This
opposition arises primarily because the merit system will reduce the
number of candidates for office and because the primary system in
Arkansas has traditionally been financed by the parties collecting
candidate filing fees. 47 Under this system, the loss of filing fees
from judicial candidates would cause the costs of primary elections
to be borne by other candidates for office.'4 The evil here is that
the state has not funded the primary elections directly. A change
in how Arkansas funds primaries may now be on the near horizon.
On March 2, 1995, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit held the current system unconstitutional. 49 Although
a change in how primary elections are funded may not change party
attitudes about judicial elections, it may remove an irrelevant political
barrier to the establishment of merit selection for the judiciary.
an appointment system for judges because it increases the Governor's powers The
consequence of these factors is that it is difficult to convince legislators of the
merit of merit selection.
147. The relevant statute provides:
Subject to the provisions of this act and other applicable laws of this
state, organized political parties shall:
(1) Have the right to prescribe the qualifications of their own membership;
(2) Prescribe the qualifiations for voting in their party primaries;
(3) Establish rules and procedures for their own organization;
(4) Pay the expenses of their own primary election. However, any part
of the expenses of a primary election may be paid by a county whenever
an appropriation therefor is made by the quorum court of the county.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-3-101 (Michie 1987).
148. The Judicial Reform Bill that was considered during the 1995 legislative
session reveals the importance of this issue. To appease party officials, the Bar
included a provision that continues filing fees for nonpartisan judicial elections and
distributes those fees to the parties for the cost of primary elections See Editorial,
Judicial Reform? Not if It's Left up to the Ledge, ARKANsAS DEMOCRAT-GAzETTE,
Oct. 12, 1994, at 6B.
149. Republican Party v. Faulkner County, No. 94-1684, 1995 WL 85383 (8th
Cir. Mar. 2, 1995). The court stated:
We find that the state of Arkansas has failed to come forward with a
compelling state interest necessitating the heavy burdens placed upon the
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of voters and political parties by
the dual requirements that parties both conduct and fund primary elections
as a condition of ballot access. Consequently, the combined effect of Ark.
Code Ann. §§ 7-7-102(a) and 7-3-101(4) renders those provisions uncon-
stitutional as they operate in conjunction with one another. Cognizant of
our role as a federal court, we do not purport to advise Arkansas on the
best means of rendering constitutional its election code: that decision rests
with the sound judgment of the Arkansas legislature.
Id. at *12.
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VII. REACHING FOR JUDICIAL SELECTION REFORM
Clearly, Arkansas will not easily achieve judicial reform that
includes the merit selection of judges. As indicated, there are out-
spoken and financially interested opponents. What can be done to
overcome this resistance?
Those who are interested and dedicated to merit selection of
judges need to develop a plan. Merit selection did not come to
Wyoming without a fight. The proponents organized.15 0 The Judicial
Selection and Tenure Committee of the Wyoming State Bar actively
promoted the changes. They held well publicized "Citizens' Con-
ferences" where the issues concerning judicial selection were discussed
by local and national authorities before widely represented audiences.
Proponents encouraged newspapers throughout the state to promote
the conferences. At one of these conferences, organizers formed a
geographically and professionally diverse steering committee to di-
rectly promote merit selection in the state. Moreover, organizers
obtained funds from the state bar, a state planning committee, the
judicial conference, and members of the state bar. It seems to me
that if substantial reform is to come to pass, an organized effort
of this nature will be required.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In evaluating the merits and defects of the two judicial selection
systems under discussion in relation to the general aims of a judicial
selection method, the merit selection system is the best. First, in
regard to the desire to assure judicial independence, merit selection
surpasses any contested election system. Although retention elections
are not free from problems in this regard, contested election systems
threaten far greater harm to judicial independence. Second, through
the selection commission's processes of recruitment, interviews, and
deliberation, the merit selection system is designed to recruit a high
quality judiciary. Contested election systems may by chance accom-
plish this as well, but the potential for less qualified judges is greater.
Third, merit selection is superior to contested election systems in
providing for accountability in a greater number of judicial positions
because retention elections apply to all judges. The common "un-
contested" election does not exist. Fourth, the merit selection system
opens up the process to a wider range of lawyers from a wider
150. See Proceedings of the Wyoming State Bar Convention 1972, 8 LAND &
WATER L. REV. 359, 386 (1973) (containing the report of the Judicial Selection
and Tenure Committee).
[Vol. 17:281
MERIT SELECTION OF JUDGES
variety of backgrounds. There are no barriers to candidacy such as
the contested election system creates. Consequently, merit selection
has a greater opportunity than contested election systems do of
expanding the pool of lawyers who will seek judicial positions and
thereby results in creating a more representative judiciary. Finally,
by stabilizing the selection processes, by selecting a better qualified
and more diversified judiciary, by allowing the electorate through
retention elections to make a decision on all judges, and by elim-
inating the perceptions of conflicts of interests, merit selection systems
clearly sustain and justify public confidence in the fairness and
integrity of the judicial system. The experience of states such as
Wyoming that have merit selection obviates these facts.
I end where I began. There is a great deal of disagreement
about merit selection and its value. My personal observations of the
system in Wyoming convinced me that it was a wise decision for
that state to change from a nonpartisan election system to a merit
selection system. My research into the issue for this Article cor-
roborates these observations and thus reconfirms my opinion. Ar-
kansas, today, is similar to the Wyoming of the 1970's. Arkansas
needs a merit selection system for its judges. I intend to be a strong
advocate for this change. It is hoped that this Symposium on Ar-
kansas Law: The Arkansas Courts, for which this article was written,
can act as a catalyst for action on this important subject.
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APPENDIX A
[T]he Wyoming merit selection plan is incorporated into subpart (b)-
(h) of section 4, Article V of the Wyoming Constitution. Subpart
(a) concerns the number of supreme court justices, what constitutes
a quorum, selection of a chief justice, and temporary replacement
of a justice. The Wyoming Statutes include sections expanding the
scope of the constitution's application to county courts and defining
the terms of the commissioners.]
WYOMING CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE V, SECTION 4.*
§ 4 Supreme court generally; number; election of chief justice;
quorum; vacancies in supreme court or district court; judicial nom-
inating commission; terms; standing for retention in office.
(a) The supreme court of the state shall consist of not less than
three nor more than five justices as may be determined by the
legislature. The justices of the court shall elect one of their number
to serve as chief justice for such term and with such authority as
shall be prescribed by law. A majority of the justices shall constitute
a quorum, and a concurrence of a majority of such quorum shall
be sufficient to decide any matter. If a justice of the supreme court
for any reason shall not participate in hearing any matter, the chief
justice may designate one of the district judges to act for such
nonparticipating justice.
(b) A vacancy in the office of justice of the supreme court or
judge of any district court or of such other courts that may be
made subject to this provision by law, shall be filled by a qualified
person appointed by the governor from a list of three nominees
that shall be submitted by the judicial nominating commission. The
commission shall submit such a list not later than 60 days after the
deaIlI, retir'ement, wndcr of resigntionav., re.................. in
cumbent to file a declaration of candidacy or certification of a
negative majority vote on the question of retention in office under
section [subsection] (g) hereof. If the governor shall fail to make
any such appointment within 30 days from the day the list is
submitted to him, such appointment shall be made by the chief
justice from the list within 15 days.
(c) There shall be a judicial nominating commission for the
supreme court, district courts and any other courts to which these
provisions may be extended by law. The commission shall consist
* Copyright State of Wyoming.
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of seven members, one of whom shall be the chief justice, or a
justice of the supreme court designated by the chief justice to act
for him, who shall be chairman thereof. In addition to the chief
justice, or his designee, three resident members of the bar engaged
in active practice shall be elected by the Wyoming state bar and
three electors of the state not admitted to practice law shall be
appointed by the governor to serve on said commission for such
staggered terms as shall be prescribed by law. No more than two
members of said commission who are residents of the same judicial
district may qualify to serve any term or part of a term on the
commission. In the case of courts having less than statewide au-
thority, each judicial district not otherwise represented by a member
on the commission, and each county, should the provisions hereof
be extended by law to courts of lesser jurisdiction than district
courts, shall be represented by two nonvoting advisors to the com-
mission when an appointment to a court in such unrepresented
district, or county, is pending; both of such advisors shall be residents
of the district, or county, and one shall be a member of the bar
appointed by the governing body of the Wyoming state bar and
one shall be a nonattorney advisor appointed by the governor.
(d) No member of the commission excepting the chairman shall
hold any federal, state or county public office or any political party
office, and after serving a full term he shall not be eligible for
reelection or reappointment to succeed himself on the commission.
No member of the judicial nominating commission shall be eligible
for appointment to any judicial office while he is a member of the
commission nor for a period of one year after the expiration of his
term for which he was elected or appointed. Vacancies in the office
of commissioner shall be filled for the unexpired terms in the same
manner as the original appointments. Additional qualifications of
members of the commission may be prescribed by law.
(e) The chairman of the commission shall cast votes only in
the event of ties. The commission shall operate under rules adopted
by the supreme court. Members of the commission shall be entitled
to no compensation other than expenses incurred for travel and
subsistence while attending meetings of the commission.
(f) The terms of supreme court justices shall be eight years and
the terms of district court judges shall be six years.
(g) Each justice or judge selected under these provisions shall
serve for one year after his appointment and until the first Monday
in January following the next general election after the expiration
of such year. He shall, at such general election, stand for retention
in office on a ballot which shall submit to the appropriate electorate
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the question whether such justice or judge shall be retained in office
for another term or part of a term, and upon filing a declaration
of candidacy in the form and at the times prescribed by law, he
shall, at the general election next held before the expiration of each
term, stand for retention on such ballots. The electorate of the
whole state shall vote on the question of retention or rejection of
justices of the supreme court, and any other statewide court; the
electorate of the several judicial districts shall vote on the question
of retention or rejection of judges of their respective districts, and
the electorate of such other subdivisions of the state as shall be
prescribed by law shall vote on the question of retention or rejection
of any other judges to which these provisions may be extended.
(h) A justice or judge selected hereunder, or one that is in
office upon the effective date of this amendment, who shall desire
to retain his judicial office a succeeding term, following the expiration
of his existing term of office, shall file with the appropriate office
not more than 6 months nor less than 3 months before the general
election to be held before the expiration of his existing term of
office a declaration of intent to stand for election for a succeeding
term. When such a declaration of intent is filed, the appropriate
electorate shall vote upon a nonpartisan judicial ballot on the question
of retention in or rejection from office of such justice or judge,
and if a majority of those voting on the question vote affirmatively,
the justice or judge shall be elected to serve the succeeding term
prescribed by law. If a justice or judge fails to file such a declaration
within the time specified, or if a majority of those voting on the
question vote negatively to any judicial candidacy, a vacancy will
thereby be created in that office at the end of its existing term.
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APPENDIX B
PORTIONS OF THE ARKANSAS BAR ASSOCIATION
DRAFT JUDICIAL ARTICLE FOR THE
ARKANSAS CONSTITUTION
SECTION 17. SELECTION OF APPELLATE JUSTICES AND
JUDGES.
(A) VACANCIES.
Vacancies in the office of Justice of the Supreme Court or
Judge of the Court of Appeals shall be filled by appointment by
the Governor from three qualified candidates whose names are sub-
mitted to him by the Judicial Nominating Commission, established
and organized as provided in this Article. The names of these
nominees shall be submitted to the Governor by the Commission
within thirty (30) days from the date the vacancy occurs. If the
Governor fails to make the selection within thirty (30) days from
the date the names are submitted to him, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court shall make the selection from the nominees. If the
vacancy is in the office of Chief Justice, and the Governor fails to
act within the specified period, then the Lieutenant Governor shall
make the selection from the nominee.
(B) TERMS OF JUDGES-RETENTION IN OFFICE-
ELECTION.
Each Justice or Judge selected pursuant to these provisions shall
hold office for an initial term ending December 31, following the
next general election after the expiration of twenty-four (24) months
in office. Not less than sixty (60) days before the general election
next preceding the expiration of the term of any Justice or Judge
selected under this section or retained in office pursuant to Section
19(A)(1), any such justice or judge may file a declaration of candidacy
for election to succeed himself with the office of the Secretary of
State. If a declaration is not so filed, the position shall be filled
by selection as is provided for in this Article. If such a declaration
is filed, his name alone shall be submitted at the next general election
to the voters, without regard to party affiliation as follows:
1994]
UALR LAW JOURNAL
"Shall [Justice] [Judge]
of the Court be
retained in office?
Yes No (Mark One).
If a majority of the votes cast on the question are against
retaining the Justice or Judge in office a vacancy shall exist upon
the expiration of his term of office, which vacancy shall be filled
by selection as provided for in this Article; otherwise, the Justice
or Judge shall, unless removed pursuant to this Constitution, remain
in office for the number of years after December 31 following such
election as is provided for the full term of such office, and at the
expiration of each term shall be eligible until he has reached the
age of seventy (70) years for retention in office by election in the
manner prescribed in this Article.
(C) COMPOSITION OF JUDICIAL NOMINATING
COMMISSION.
The Judicial Nominating Commission shall consist of a member
of the Supreme Court to be selected by said Court, who shall serve
as chairman, one attorney from each congressional district, as they
are composed on January 1, 1990, and one lay member from each
such congressional district.
The attorney members shall be selected by majority vote of the
licensed attorneys actually voting and residing within the congres-
sional district from which the attorney is selected. This election shall
be conducted by the Clerk of the Supreme Court, pursuant to rules
promulgated by the Supreme Court.
The lay members of the Commission shall be selected by majority
vote of the Governor, Lieutenant Governor and Attorney General.
(D) QUALIFICATIONS OF COMMISSIONERS-
RESTRICTIONS.
Each member of the Judicial Nominating Commission shall be
a qualified elector, and shall hold office until his successor is selected
and certified. The attorney members and lay members of the Judicial
Nominating Commission shall be ineligible to serve if they hold any
elective or appointive office of any executive, judicial, or legislative
branch of the federal government, the state, or municipality, a
county, or if they hold any office in a political party.
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(E) CERTIFICATION AND ORGANIZATION OF
COMMISSIONERS.
The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall immediately after the
election of the Supreme Court member and the attorney members
of the Judicial Nominating Commission, certify to the Secretary of
State, the names of the Supreme Court member and the attorney
members. The Governor shall immediately certify to the Secretary
of State the names of all lay members appointed. The Secretary of
State shall then notify each of the certified persons of his membership
on the Commission. Successors to these members shall be certified
and notified in the same manner. The Commission shall then promptly
meet and organize. A majority of members of the Judicial Nomi-
nating Commission shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of
business and any act of the Judicial Nominating Commission shall
require the affirmative vote of a majority of the total membership
of that Commission.
(F) TENURE OF COMMISSIONERS.
The members of the Judicial Nominating Commission shall serve
staggered terms of four (4) years, provided that four of the initial
members shall serve two (2) years, and five members shall serve
four (4) years; and the successors of each shall serve four (4) years.
These staggered terms shall be decided by the drawing of lots. No
members shall serve for longer than two terms. At the end of the
term of any member the office shall become vacant.
(G) VACANCIES ON THE JUDICIAL NOMINATING
COMMISSION.
Vacancies occurring on the Judicial Nominating Commission
shall be filled in the same manner as the original appointments were
made. The person selected to fill a vacancy shall hold office for
the remainder of the term of the commissioner whose office became
vacant and shall be eligible for reappointment or selection for only
one additional term.
(H) ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES.
The members of the Judicial Nominating Commission shall
receive no salary or other compensation for their services, but shall
receive their necessary traveling and other expenses incurred in the
discharge of their official duties.
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SECTION 18. ELECTION OF TRIAL JUDGES.
(A) Circuit Judges and District Judges shall be elected on a
nonpartisan basis by a majority of qualified electors voting for such
office within the circuits or districts which they serve.
(B) Vacancies in these offices shall be filled by appointment by
the Governor from three qualified candidates whose names are
submitted by the Judicial Nominating Commission. Judges who are
selected by this method shall be eligible to succeed themselves.
SECTION 19. TRANSITION PROVISION-TENURE OF
PRESENT JUSTICES AND JUDGES-
JURISDICTION OF PRESENT COURTS.
(A) TENURE OF PRESENT JUSTICES AND JUDGES.
(1) Justices of the Supreme Court and Judges of the Court
of Appeals in office at the time this Amendment takes effect shall
continue in office until the end of the terms for which they were
elected or appointed.
(2) All Circuit, all Chancery, and all Circuit-Chancery
Judges in office at the time this Amendment takes effect shall
continue in office as Circuit Judges until the end of the terms for
which they were elected or appointed; provided further, the respective
jurisdictional responsibilities for matters legal, equitable or juvenile
in nature as presently exercised by such Judges shall continue until
changed pursuant to law.
(3) Municipal Court Judges in office at the time this
Amendment takes effect shall continue in office until December 31,
1996, and all jurisdiction vested in municipal, corporation, police,
mayor, justice of the peace and courts of common pleas in existence
at the time of passage of this Amendment shall be vested in the
municipal court until December 31, 1996; provided, should a vacancy
occur in an office of a Municipal Judge, that vacancy or term of
office shall be filled for a term which shall end December 31, 1996.
(B) JURISDICTION OF PRESENT COURTS.
(1) The jurisdiction conferred on Circuit Courts established by
this Amendment includes all matters previously cognizable by Circuit,
Chancery and Probate Courts. The geographic circuits and subject
matter divisions of these courts existing at the time this Amendment
takes effect shall become circuits and divisions of the Circuit Court
as herein established until changed pursuant to this Amendment.
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Circuit Courts shall assume the jurisdiction of Circuit, Chancery
and Probate Courts.
(2) District Courts shall have the jurisdiction vested in Mu-
nicipal, Corporation, Police, Mayor's, Justice of the Peace Courts
and Courts of Common Pleas at the time this Amendment takes
effect. District Courts shall assume the jurisdiction of these Courts
of limited jurisdiction and other jurisdiction conferred in this Amend-
ment on January 1, 1997.
(C) CONTINUATION OF COURTS.
The Supreme Court provided for in this Constitution shall be
a continuation of the Supreme Court now existing. The Court of
Appeals shall be regarded as a continuation of the Court of Appeals
now existing. All laws and parts of laws relating to the Supreme
Court and to the Court of Appeals which are not in conflict or
inconsistent with this Amendment shall remain in full force and
effect and shall apply to the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals,
respectively, established by this Amendment until amended, repealed
or superseded by appropriate action of the General Assembly or the
Supreme Court pursuant to this Amendment. The Circuit Courts
shall be regarded as a continuation of the Circuit, Chancery, Probate
and Juvenile Courts now existing. The District Courts shall be
regarded as a continuation of the Municipal Court, Police Courts,
Mayor's Courts, and Justice of Peace Courts now existing. All the
papers and records pertaining to said courts shall be transferred
accordingly and no suit or prosecution of any kind or nature shall
abate because of any change made by this Amendment. All writs,
actions, suits, proceedings, civil or criminal liabilities, prosecutions,
judgments, decrees, orders, sentences, regulations, causes of action
and appeals existing on the effective date of this Amendment shall
continue unaffected except as modified in accordance with this
Amendment.
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APPENDIX C
ARKANSAS CODE OF 1987 ANNOTATED* AND
ARKANSAS CONSTITUTION
AMEND. LXVI. JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY
COMMISSION.
[Current through amendments of Act 561 of the 1993 Regular
Session]
(a) Commission: Under the judicial power of the State, a Judicial
Discipline and Disability Commission is established and shall be
comprised of nine persons: three justices or judges, appointed by
the Supreme Court; three licensed attorneys in good standing who
are not justices or judges, one appointed by the Attorney General,
one by the President of the Senate, and one by the Speaker of the
House; and three members appointed by the Governor. The members
appointed by the Governor shall not be justices or judges, retired
justices or judges, or attorneys. Alternate members shall be selected
and vacancies filled in the same manner.
(b) Discipline, Suspension, Leave, and Removal: The Commis-
sion may initiate, and shall receive and investigate, complaints con-
cerning misconduct of all justices and judges, and requests and
suggestions for leave or involuntary disability retirement. Any judge
or justice may voluntarily request that the Commission recommend
suspension because of pending disciplinary action or leave because
of a mental or physical disability. Grounds for sanctions imposed
by the Commission or recommendations made by the Commission
shall be violations of the professional and ethical standards governing
judicial officers, conviction of a felony, or physical or mental dis-
ability that prevents the proper performance of judicial duties. Grounds
for suspension, leave, or removal from office shall be determined
by legislative enactment.
(c) Discipline: If, after notice and hearing, the Commission by
majority vote of the membership determines that grounds exist for
the discipline of a judge or justice, it may reprimand or censure
the judge or justice, who may appeal to the Supreme Court. The
Commission may, if it determines that grounds exist, after notice
and hearing, and by majority vote of the membership, recommend
to the Supreme Court that a judge or justice be suspended, with
or without pay, or be removed, and the Supreme Court, en banc,
may take such action. Under this amendment, a judge who also
* Copyright, State of Arkansas.
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has executive or legislative responsibilities shall be suspended or
removed only from judicial duties. In any hearing involving a Su-
preme Court justice, all Supreme Court justices shall be disqualified
from participation.
(d) Leave and Retirement: If, after notice and hearing, the
Commission by majority vote of the membership determines that a
judge or justice is unable because of physical or mental disability
to perform the duties of office, the Commission may recommend
to the Supreme Court that the judge or justice be granted leave
with pay or be retired, and the Supreme Court, en banc, may take
such action. A judge or justice retired by the Surpeme Court shall
be considered to have retired voluntarily as provided by law.
(e) Vacancies: Vacancies created by suspension, the granting of
leave or the removal of a judge or justice, or vacancies created by
disqualification of justices, shall be filled as provided by law.
(f) Rules: The Supreme Court shall make procedural rules im-
plementing this amendment and setting the length of terms on the
Commission.
(g) Cumulative Nature: This amendment is alternative to, and
cumulative with, impeachment and address authorized by this Con-
stitution.
Publisher's Notes. This amendment was proposed by Senate
Joint Resolution 5 (see Acts 1987, p. 2880) and was adopted at the
1988 general election by a vote of 431,864 for and 286,699 against.
ARKANSAS CODE OF 1987 ANNOTATED
Title 16. Practice, Procedure, and Courts, Subtitle 2. Courts
and Court Officers, Chapter 10. General Provisions Subchapter, 4.
Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission.
16-10-401 Definitions.
The word "judge" in this subchapter means anyone, whether
or not a lawyer, who is an officer of the judicial system performing
judicial functions, including an officer such as a referee, special
master, court commissioner, or magistrate, whether full-time or part-
time.
16-10-402 Creation.
(a) There is hereby established a committee to be known as the
Arkansas Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission, hereinafter
referred to as the "commission", consisting of nine (9) members,
each of whom shall be residents of Arkansas, and shall be appointed
as follows:
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(1) Three (3) members shall be judges of the Arkansas Court
of Appeals, circuit court, chancery court, or municipal court appointed
by the Arkansas Supreme Court.
(2) Three (3) members shall be lawyers admitted to practice in
Arkansas who are not judges or former or retired judges, one (1)
of whom shall be appointed by the Attorney General, one (1) by
the President of the Senate, and one (1) by the Speaker of the
House; and
(3) Three (3) members, who are neither lawyers, or judges, or
former or retired judges, appointed by the Governor.
(b)(1) A commission member shall serve for a term of six (6)
years and shall be eligible for reappointment to a second full term.
(2) A member appointed to a term of less than six (6) years
or to fill an unexpired term may be reappointed to two (2) full
terms.
(3) The appointing authority for each category of commission
membership shall also appoint an alternate member for each regular
member appointed. An alternate member shall be appointed for a
term of six (6) years and may be reappointed for a second term.
An alternate member appointed to fill an unexpired term shall be
eligible for an appointment for two (2) full terms.
(c) If a commission member or an alternate commission member
moves out of the jurisdiction, ceases to be eligible for appointment
to represent the category for which he was appointed, or becomes
unable to serve for any reason, a vacancy shall occur, an appointment
to fill a vacancy for the duration of its unexpired term shall be
made by the appropriate appointing authority, effective no later than
sixty (60) days from the occurrence of the vacancy. If a vacancy
is not filled in accordance with this paragraph, the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court shall, within ten (10) days thereafter, appoint,
from the category to be represented, a member who shall serve for
the duration of the unexpired term.
(d) Commission members shall serve without pay, but shall be
entitled to maximum per diem expenses as authorized by the General
Assembly for each day attending meetings of the commission or in
attending to official business as authorized by the commission, and,
in addition thereto, shall be entitled to mileage for official travel
in attending commission meetings or other official business of the
commission, at the rate provided by law or state travel regulations
for reimbursement to state employees for official state travel.
16-10-403 Directors-Staff.
(a) The commission shall employ a director and such additional
professional and clerical staff as may be authorized, from time to
time, by appropriation passed by the General Assembly.
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(b) Effective July 1, 1994, the Director of the Judicial Discipline
and Disability Commission shall be an attorney licensed to practice
in the State of Arkansas.
(c) The director shall not engage in the practice of law nor
serve in a judicial capacity during his or her employment.
16-10-404 Duties-Records.
(a) The commission shall initiate or shall receive information,
conduct investigation and hearings, and make recommendations to
the Arkansas Supreme Court concerning:
(1) Allegations of judicial misconduct;
(2) Allegations of physical or mental disability of judges requiring
leave or involuntary retirement; and
(3) Matters of voluntary retirement or leave for disability.
(b)(1) Investigatory records, files, and reports of the commission
are confidential, and no disclosure of information, written, recorded,
or oral, received or developed by the commission in the course of
an investigation related to alleged misconduct or disability of a
judge, shall be made except as follows:
(A) Upon waiver in writing by the judge at any stage of the
proceedings;
(B) Upon inquiry by an appointing authority or by a state or
federal agency conducting investigations on behalf of such authority
in connection with the selection or appointment of judges;
(C) In cases in which the subject matter or the fact of the filing
of charges has become public, if deemed appropriate by the
commission, it may issue a statement in order to confirm the pendency
of the investigation, to clarify the procedural aspects of the
proceedings, to explain the right of the judge to a fair hearing, and
to state that the judge denies the allegations;
(D) Upon inquiry in connection with the assignment or recall
of a retired judge to judicial duties, by or on behalf of the assigning
authority;
(E) Upon the commission's taking final action with respect to
a complaint about a judge, notice of the final action shall become
public information;
(F) Where the circumstances necessitating the initiation of an
inquiry include notoriety, or where the conduct in question is a
matter of public record, information concerning the lack of cause
to proceed shall be released by the commission;
(G) If, during the course of or after an investigation or hearing,
the commission reasonably believes that there may have been a
violation of any rules of professional conduct of attorneys at law,
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the commission may release such information to any committee,
commission, agency, or body within or outside of the state empowered
to investigate, regulate, or adjudicate matters incident to the legal
profession; or
(H) If, during the course of or after an investigation or hearing,
the commission reasonably believes that there may have been a
violation of criminal law, the commission shall release such information
to the appropriate prosecuting attorney.
(2) All proceedings held prior to a determination of probable
cause and the filing of formal charges shall be confidential. Any
hearing scheduled after the filing of formal charges shall be open
to the press and to the public, except that, following the completion
of the introduction of all evidence, the commission may convene to
executive session for the purpose of deliberating its final conclusions
and recommendations, provided that, upon completion of the executive
session, the final action of the commission shall be announced in
an open and public session.
(3) The commission is authorized to request the appropriate
prosecuting authorities to seek to obtain immunity from criminal
prosecution for a reluctant witness using the procedure outlined in
§ 16-43-601 et seq.
16-10-405 Rules.
The Arkansas Supreme Court shall adopt rules with regard to
all matters of commission operations and all disciplinary and disability
proceedings and promulgate rules of procedure.
16-10-406 Immunity from suit.
Members of the commission, referees, commission counsel and
staff shall be absolutely immune from suit for all conduct in the
course of their official duties.
16-10-407 Leave.
Grounds for leave consist of a temporary physical or mental
incapacity which impairs the ability of the judge to substantially
perform the duties of his or her judicial office and which exists or
is likely to exist for a period of one (1) year or less. Leave cannot
be granted to exceed one (1) year.
16-10-408 Suspension with pay.
A judge may be suspended by the Supreme Court with pay:
(1) While an indictment or information charging him or her in
any court in the United States with a crime punishable as a felony
under the laws of Arkansas or the United States is pending:
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(2) While a recommendation to the Supreme Court by the
commission for his or her removal, or involuntary disability retirement
is pending; or
(3) When articles of impeachment have been voted by the House
of Representatives.
16-10-409 Mandatory suspension.
A judge shall be suspended from office with pay by the Supreme
Court when in any court in the United States he pleads guilty or
no contest to, or is found guilty of an offense punishable as, a
felony under the laws of Arkansas or the United States, or of any
other offense that involves moral turpitude. If his conviction becomes
final, he may be removed from office pursuant to § 16-10-410. If
his conviction is reversed and he is cleared of the charge, by order
of the court, whether without further trial or after further trial and
a finding of not guilty, his suspension terminates. Nothing in this
section shall prevent the commission from determining that a judge
be disciplined or removed according to § 16-10-410.
16-10-410 Removal from office.
(a) The grounds for removal conferred by this subchapter shall
be both alternative and cumulative to the power of impeachment
provided by the Constitution and removal otherwise provided by
law.
(b) A judge may be removed from office on any of the following
grounds:
(1) Conviction of any offense punishable as a felony under the
laws of Arkansas or the United States;
(2) Conviction of a criminal act that reflects adversely on the
judge's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a judge in other
respects;
(3) The commission of conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit, or misrepresentation;
(4) The commission of conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice;
(5) Willful violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct or
Professional Responsibility;
(6) Willful and persistent failure to perform the duties of office;
(7) Habitual intemperance in the use of alcohol or other drugs.
(c) In considering recommending removal, the commission may
consider the frequency of the offense, the motivation of the conduct,
the length of time since the conduct in question, and similar factors.
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(d) Any judge removed from office pursuant to this subchapter
cannot be appointed thereafter to serve as a judge.
16-10-411 Vacancy.
The granting of leave, suspension, with or without pay, removal,
or involuntary disability retirement pursuant to this subchapter shall
create a vacancy in the judicial office.
